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ABSTRACT

The security objectives enforce the security policy, which defines what is to be protected in a
network environment. The violation of these security objectives induces security threats. We
introduce an explicit notion of security objectives for a security protocol. This notion should
precede the formal verification process. In the absence of such a notion, the security protocol may
be proven correct despite the fact that it is not equipped to defend against all potential threats. In
order to establish the correctness of security objectives, we present a formal model that provides
basis for the formal verification of security protocols.
We also develop the modal logic, proof based, and multi-agent approaches using the Strand
Space framework. In our modal logic approach, we present the logical constructs to model a
protocol’s behavior in such a way that the participants can verify different security parameters by
looking at their own run of the protocol. In our proof based model, we present a generic set of
proofs to establish the correctness of a security protocol. We model the 802.11i protocol into our
proof based system and then perform the formal verification of the authentication property. The
intruder in our model is imbued with powerful capabilities and repercussions to possible attacks
are evaluated. Our analysis proves that the authentication of 802.11i is not compromised in the
presented model. We further demonstrate how changes in our model will yield a successful manin-the-middle attack.
Our multi-agent approach includes an explicit notion of multi-agent, which was missing in the
Strand Space framework. The limitation of Strand Space framework is the assumption that all the
information available to a principal is either supplied initially or is contained in messages received
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by that principal. However, other important information may also be available to a principal in a
security setting, such as a principal may combine information from different roles played by him in
a protocol to launch a powerful attack. Our presented approach models the behavior of a distributed
system as a multi-agent system. The presented model captures the combined information, the
formal model of knowledge, and the belief of agents over time. After building this formal model,
we present a formal proof of authentication of the 4-way handshake of the 802.11i protocol.

iv

To my parents and my fiancée

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Allah for blessing me with courage and resources to pursue my objectives. I
would like to acknowledge my mother Shama Furqan and my father Muhammad Furqan for their
love, support, sacrifice, and prayers throughout this work. My parents have always considered
my education as their first priority and have always provided me with the best. It is through their
efforts, support, encouragement, and prayers that I have made it through all the tests to reach this
point in life and I could not have done it without them. I would also like to acknowledge my fiancée
Sonia and her family (especially her mom Nuzhat) for their continued love, prayers, and delicious
meals. They have always been there supporting me and always understood the importance of my
work. Sonia is an important part of my life and I thank her for never losing trust in me. Together,
my parents and my fiancée have made valuable contributions and it is to them that I dedicate this
dissertation.
I am deeply indebted to Professor Ratan K. Guha who has been my advisor throughout this
work and is the chair of my dissertation committee. His contributions, detailed comments, and
insights have been of great value to me. I owe him lots of gratitude for showing me this methodology of research. He has kept an eye on the progress of my work and has always given me valuable
advices. I would also like to thank the other members of my dissertation committee, Professor
Mostafa Bassiouni, Dr. Joohan Lee, and Dr. Mainak Chatterjee, who monitored my work and took
effort in reading this thesis.
I would also like to mention the contributions of my colleagues at Network and Security lab
at UCF. I wish them all success and a great career in their research areas. In particular, I would

vi

like to acknowledge Shahabuddin Muhammad who has worked with me on the same projects.
Shahabuddin and I have spent countless nights working on the formal verification, 802.11i, Strand
Space, and other research areas. His contributions, support, advices, and company have been very
significant. I would like to thank him for his help, trust, kindness, and sharing many experiences
and thoughts with me throughout the last five years.
During my time as a student, I have been blessed to have been surrounded by many wonderful
friends. Every one of them contributed in one way or another. Some were responsible for giving
me a push in the right direction in life, whereas others helped me out when I needed them, made
delicious meals for me, or simply cheered me up with their sense of humor. I am thankful to all of
them and wish them success and happiness. I would also like to extend my appreciations for all of
my family members and thank them for their support, faith, and prayers.
In the end, I would like to acknowledge my funding agencies. This work was partially supported by NSF under Grant EIA 0086251 and ARO under grant DAAD19-01-1-0502. The views
and conclusions herein are those of the author and do not represent the official policies of the
funding agencies or the University of Central Florida.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.1

Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.1.1

Formal Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

Our Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

1.2.1

Explicit Notion of Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

1.2.2

Formal Verification of 802.11i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

1.2.3

A Multi-agent Framework for Security protocol Verification . . . . . . . .

6

Organization of this Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

CHAPTER 2 FORMAL APPROACHES AND SECURITY OBJECTIVES . . . .

9

2.1

9

1.2

1.3

Logic Based Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1.1

Rangan’s approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

2.1.2

BAN Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

2.1.3

Moser’s Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

2.1.4

CKT5 and KPL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

2.1.5

GNY Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

2.1.6

Coffey and Saidha’s Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
viii

2.1.7
2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5

Other Logic Based Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Theorem Proving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.1

Paulson’s Inductive Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

2.2.2

Other Theorem Proving Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Model Checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.1

Longley-Rigby Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

2.3.2

Interrogator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

2.3.3

NRL Protocol Analyzer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

2.3.4

FDR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

2.3.5

MurΦ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

2.3.6

Brutus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

2.3.7

Athena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Other Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4.1

Dolev and Yao . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

2.4.2

Kemmerer’s Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

2.4.3

Type Checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

2.4.4

Strand Space Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

CHAPTER 3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN WLANS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.1

Security Policy and Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.1.1

Importance of using Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

ix

3.2

3.3

3.4

Security objectives in 802.11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.2.1

Authentication and Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

3.2.2

Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

3.2.3

Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

3.2.4

Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Security Objectives in 802.11i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3.1

Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

3.3.2

Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

3.3.3

Confidentiality and Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

3.3.4

Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

CHAPTER 4 DEVELOPING FORMAL MODELS FOR SECURITY PROTOCOLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.1

4.2

A Modal Logic Approach Based on SSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.1.1

Syntax of the Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

4.1.2

Propositional Constructs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

4.1.3

Model of Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

4.1.4

Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

4.1.5

The Proposed Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

4.1.6

Soundness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Formal Model of Security Objectives for 802.11i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

x

4.3

Building Lemmas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

4.4

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

CHAPTER 5 FORMAL VERIFICATION OF 802.11i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.1

5.2

5.3

5.4

Authentication in 802.11i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.1.1

Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

5.1.2

Open System and EAP-802.1X Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

5.1.3

Key Generation and Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

5.1.4

Secure Data Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

5.1.5

Connection Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Modelling 802.11i using Strand Spaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.2.1

Modelling EAP-802.1X Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

5.2.2

Modelling the 4-way Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

Authentication Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.3.1

Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

5.3.2

Defining the Authentication Security Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

5.3.3

Proving EAP-802.1X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

5.3.4

Proving 4-Way Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

CHAPTER 6 A MULTI-AGENT APPROACH FOR SECURITY PROTOCOL
VERIFICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.1

The Multi-agent Theoretical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
xi

6.1.1

Penetrator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

6.1.2

Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

6.2

Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

6.3

Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

6.4

Theoretical Model for the 4-Way Handshake of 802.11i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

6.5

Formal Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

6.6

6.5.1

Penetrator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

6.5.2

Authentication of the Client and the Access Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

CHAPTER 7 FUTURE WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
7.1

Additional Security Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
7.1.1

7.2

A Formal Threat model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Verification of a Wireless Mesh Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
7.2.1

Virtual Private Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

LIST OF REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

xii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1

Stages of Formal Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Figure 3.1

The Proposed Formal Verification Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Figure 3.2

Authentication in WEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Figure 3.3

Encryption in WEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Figure 3.4

RC4 Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Figure 3.5

EAP Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Figure 3.6

Authentication Using 802.1X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Figure 3.7

CCMP Encryption and Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Figure 5.1

RSNA Stages of 802.11i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Figure 5.2

A Strand Space Representation of EAP-802.1X in 802.11i. . . . . . . . . . 101

Figure 5.3

An Abstract Representation of the 4-way Handshake of 802.11i . . . . . . . 102

Figure 5.4

Case Analysis of 802.11i. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

xiii

3

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1

Security Objectives and Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Table 3.2

WEP Problems and Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Table 3.3

Summary of Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Table 3.4

Confidentiality and Integrity Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

xiv

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Computers are now performing complex tasks in critical environments such as financial institutions, medical facilities, and defense. These tasks are sensitive and can place both money and
credibility at stake. A security (or cryptographic) protocol enables communicating parties to communicate securely over an insecure network. A security protocol can be characterized as a sequence
of messages between two or more parties in which encryption is used to provide authentication or
to distribute cryptographic keys for new conversations [NS78]. The aim of security protocols is to
provide secure services on the network. Used with a communication protocol, a security protocol
provides secure delivery of data between two or more parties using cryptographic operations such
as encrypt, decrypt, and so forth.

1.1 Problem
History has proven security protocols to be vulnerable to attacks despite circumspect design and
meticulous review by the experts. For example, the Needham-Schroeder (NS) protocol was proposed in [NS78] and was later found to be flawed in [Low96]. In order to foil such vulnerabilities,
one would need to employ more sophisticated modes of analyses. Rigorous testing, programming,
and simulation can only show the presence of errors but never their absence. Hence, some formal
verification procedure is required to provide sound and complete proofs of the security properties
of a system.
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1.1.1 Formal Verification
Formal verification can be described as a process of formally proving that the model of a system
satisfies the requirement specifications of that system. The application of formal methods to security protocols refers to mathematics or logic based techniques for the specification, development,
and verification of these protocols. For security protocols, this implies modeling of both the communicating parties and the potential penetrator. Modeling of the penetrator is necessary as it may
sabotage the security protocol by compromising one or more security properties such as authentication, secrecy, etc. Formal methods are useful for the analysis of security protocols. They allow
one to do both a thorough analysis of the different paths which an intruder can take, and to specify
precisely the environmental assumptions that have been made [Mea03].
Formal verification is a multi-stage process. The authors of [HR04] define verification techniques as comprising of three parts:
• a framework for modelling systems, typically a description language of some sort,
• a specification language for describing the properties to be verified,
• and a verification method to establish whether the description of a system satisfies the specification.
This is further shown in Figure 1.1.

1.2 Our Contributions
In this section, we describe our contributions.

2

A framework for modeling
a system

A description language

A specification language

Translate the properties
that need to be verified in
the specification language

A verification method

Establish the correctness

Figure 1.1: Stages of Formal Verification

3

1.2.1 Explicit Notion of Security Objectives
We introduce an explicit notion of security objectives that needs to be defined before starting the
formal verification process. The definition of these objectives is critical because these are the
methods that enforce security policies and mitigate security risks. In this work, we address the
security of Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) in terms of its security objectives. In order
to establish the correctness of security objectives, we present a formal model that provides basis
for the formal verification of security protocols. The presented mathematical model is then used
for the correctness proofs of a WLAN using the 802.11i protocol. We also present various lemmas
that provide the foundations for our proof based framework.

1.2.1.1

Motivation and Advantages

The work done in the area of formal verification has not been focussed on the security objectives.
A good amount of work has been devoted to the inclusion of explicit notions for different forms of
knowledge. We posit that the formal approaches should explicitly model the security objectives.
This is important because analysis can prove a certain protocol correct under a set of assumptions
that might not actually hold for a specific environment. For example, BAN logic (explained in
2.1.2) proved the NS protocol correct under a set of assumptions that are not valid in some environments. An explicit notion of security objectives would have avoided this problem. In addition,
our inclusion of security objectives helps us model the set of requirements that are specific to a
certain environment.
We assert that if a designer wants to model and prove the correctness of a security protocol
that is going to be used in a certain network environment, he needs to associate an explicit notion
4

of security objectives before initiating the formal verification procedure. If the security objectives
definition is ignored for a security protocol, the security protocol will be proven correct despite
the fact that it is not equipped to defend against all potential threats. Such a protocol will fail to
achieve one or more of the ignored security objectives and will eventually be jeopardized by the
saboteurs. This potential problem will not be easy to detect and a smart saboteur can exploit this
potential weakness to cause damage.

1.2.2 Formal Verification of 802.11i
After defining the security objectives of the WLANs, we proceed to the formal verification of the
IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) 802.11i protocol. We develop the modal
logic, proof based, and multi-agent approaches using the Strand Space framework [FHG99]. In our
modal logic approach, we present the logical constructs to model a protocol’s behavior in such a
way that the participants can verify different security parameters by looking at their own run of the
protocol. In our proof based model, we present a generic set of proofs to establish the correctness
of a security protocol. We model the 802.11i protocol into our proof based system and then perform
the formal verification of the authentication property. We first categorize the 802.11i protocol in
different stages. Then, we separate the stages using strong authentication techniques from those
that do not employ strong cryptographic mechanisms. For example, open system authentication
stage in the 802.11i protocol is based on a weak authentication mechanism and hence can not be
verified or be used to provide strong authentication.
After identifying the stages that guarantee authentication in the 802.11i protocol, we formally
represent these stages in our proof based system. We then present the high level abstraction of a
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protocol run. We consider a penetrator, empower its capabilities, and evaluate the authentication
of the proposed protocol. Given the constraints and suggestions of the proposed architecture, we
state convincingly that any attempt to defy the authentication mechanism of the 802.11i protocol
will not be successful. We further describe a situation where modifications to our model will lead
to a successful man-in-the-middle attack. Our choice of SSM as a verification framework is based
on its simplicity, elegance, precision of results, and ease of developing simple and powerful proofs
even without any automated support.
In this work, we restrict ourselves to the verification of the authentication property of the security protocols. In security protocols, authentication can be described as a process of attempting
to verify the identity of an agent. Authentication is a method to ensure that users are who they say
they are. In [Low96], Lowe defined the role of the authentication protocol as a mechanism where
a pair of agents can be assured of each others identity. The agents should become sure that they
are really talking to each other rather than to an intruder impersonating the other agent. Our aim
is to verify that the user who attempts to perform certain functions in a system is the user who is
authorized to do so.

1.2.3 A Multi-agent Framework for Security protocol Verification
We present a new approach that includes the notion of multi-agent for the formal verification of
security protocols. In particular, our focus is to verify the authentication property in a multi-agent
environment. The intuition is to capture the behavior of a distributed system as a multi-agent
system. An agent is an abstraction that is used in the distributed systems to represent an entity
such as a process or a principal. It is important to give a clear notion of multi-agent systems
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in the proposed frameworks for the security protocol verification in order to represent the formal
model of knowledge. For example, the limitation of Strand Space framework is the assumption that
all the information available to a principal is either supplied initially or is contained in messages
received by that principal [HP03]. However, other important information may also be available
to a principal in a security setting, such as a principal may combine information from different
roles played by him in a protocol to launch a powerful attack. The presented model captures the
combined information, the formal model of knowledge, and the belief of agents over time. After
building this formal model, we present a formal proof of authentication of the 4-way handshake of
the 802.11i protocol.

1.3 Organization of this Thesis
The rest of this document is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 describes a brief overview of efforts in the field of formal verification of cryptographic protocols. We categorize the efforts made in the formal verification of security protocols
in three areas namely logic based approaches, theorem proving, and model checking. All formal
techniques begin by expressing the cryptographic protocol in a formal notation or a model and then
prove that the expressed model achieves its security goals. In addition, we describe how security
objectives were targeted in these approaches. We also discuss how the lack of an explicit notion
of security objectives will be a hurdle in the deployment of a protocol from one environment to
another and will increase the level of required human interaction and expertise.
In Chapter 3, we describe the security objectives of the WLANs and the protocols developed
to meet these objectives in the 802.11 WLANs. We specify authentication and access control,
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confidentiality, integrity, and availability, as common security objectives of a WLAN. We establish
the importance of these security objectives by describing attacks on the WLAN security. These
attacks are induced in a WLAN when one or more security objectives are compromised.
In Chapter 4, we develop the modal logic and the proof based models for the security protocol
verification using the Strand Space framework. Our model captures the notion of matching parameters and provides guarantees on the parameters associated with each principal. We present a
generic set of proofs to establish the correctness of a security protocol. We also present a formal
model for security objectives of 802.11i.
In Chapter 5, we perform the formal verification of the 802.11i protocol using our proof based
system. In this Chapter, we prove the authentication of the proposed 802.11i protocol. We start
with separating the stages of 802.11i that guarantee authentication from those that do not guarantee
authentication because of the lack of any strong cryptographic mechanism. Then, we model the
authentication stages of 802.11i with strong cryptographic support, using SSM. After modelling
in SSM, we carry out the formal verification of these stages using the Strand Space verification
techniques.
In Chapter 5, we present a framework to model the security protocols as multi-agent protocols.
The presented model captures the combined information, the formal model of knowledge, and
the belief of agents over time. After building this formal model, we present a formal proof of
authentication of the 4-way handshake in the 802.11i protocol.
After describing our research, we describe our work plan for future in Chapter 7. The conclusion is followed in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 2
FORMAL APPROACHES AND SECURITY OBJECTIVES

Employing informal methods for security protocol verification has yielded poor results. The application of formal methods to cryptographic protocols refers to mathematics or logic based techniques for the specification, development, and verification of these protocols. Formal methods are
used to give a description of the system to be developed at the specific levels of detail desired.
This formal description can be used for the system verification. We categorize the efforts made in
the formal verification of security protocols in three areas namely logic based approaches, theorem
proving, and model checking. We present a brief summary of them in this chapter.
When a protocol is developed to achieve a desired level of security, it is designed within the
context of a set of requirements. When the same protocol is used to solve a similar problem under a
different environment, different attacks are introduced. This is not because of any design weakness
in the original protocol. Rather this is a consequence of a lack of an explicit security objectives
notion associated with this protocol. In addition to describing related approaches in this chapter, we
describe how security objectives were addressed in the earlier approaches, how assumptions were
made about the operating environment, and how critical it was to address the security objectives
under the operating environment.

2.1 Logic Based Approaches
These approaches utilize modal logic to reason about knowledge and belief about messages in a
distributed system. Modal logic consists of various statements about belief in or knowledge about
messages in a distributed system. It also provides the inference rules for deriving new beliefs
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and/or new knowledge from available beliefs and knowledge. The goal of logic based analysis is
to infer or prove the correctness condition of the protocol. The techniques based on the logic of
belief are considered useful in evaluating the trust, which may be placed in a security protocol. On
the other hand, techniques based on the logic of knowledge are suitable for proving the security
protocol’s security [CP97]. In the logic based approaches, protocol verification is a deductive
reasoning process. The first step is to specify rules of inference and axioms. After specifications,
the deductive process proceeds as follows [CP97]:
• formally express protocol steps in the language of the logic,
• formally express the desired protocol goals,
• starting with the initial protocol assumptions, build up logical statements after each protocol
step using the logical axioms and inference rules,
• compare the logical statements with the desired protocol goals to see if the goals are achieved.
We present a brief overview of some efforts in the logic based protocol verification in the
following lines.

2.1.1 Rangan’s approach
Rangan proposed a logic about trust and belief in [Ran88]. [Ran88] provides an axiom schema for
belief that is frequently referenced in the literature. In his notation, the term Bi p means that the
principal i believes p. The schema is as follows:
∀i; i = 1, . . . , m :
• A1 All substitution instances of propositional tautologies.
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• A2 Bi p ∧ Bi (p ⇒ q) ⇒ Bi q.
• A3 Bi p ⇒ Bi Bi p (introspection of positive belief).
• A4 ¬Bi p ⇒ Bi ¬Bi p (introspection of negative belief).
• A5 ¬Bi (false) (process i does not believe a contradiction).
The following are the inference rules.
• R1 From p and p ⇒ q infer q (modus ponens).
• R2 From p infer Bi p (generalization).
Rangan defines the transitivity, euclidian, and serial properties. From the above mentioned
rules, A3 corresponds to transitivity, given R2, A4 corresponds to the euclidian property, and
A5 corresponds to the serial property. The author views a distributed system as a collection of
communicating agents in which an agent’s state is the history of its messages. The approach builds
a model to maintain the set of beliefs. Rangan formally develops a theory of trust where the
expression of trust is the addition of a well formed formula(wff). The wff is valid for the axioms
of a logic. The proposed model builds on simple trust statements that are used to define properties
such as transitivity and Euclidean property.
Before this publication, the knowledge of trust and belief in security were used in intuitive
sense. The authors provides a formal notation to these concepts. Formal security specification and
verification methods can be integrated into Rangan’s logic. The author’s approach was targeted
at defining the knowledge of belief and trust, which are fundamental to logic based approaches.
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Rangan restricts himself to provide basis for logic based approaches and does not address security
objectives in different environments particular to any protocol.

2.1.2 BAN Logic
Burrows, Abadi, and Needham devised a logic [BAN90a] based on belief. This logic, abbreviated
as BAN logic, introduces wide range of security objects, formal notations to represent security
concepts, formulas describing the relationship between principals and data, and inference rules
that help derive new rules from existing rules. BAN logic is built upon messages sent and received
throughout a protocol session. An informal example can be given as: “If A believes that A have
received a message M encrypted with the key K, and A believes that only B knows the key K, then
A believe that the message M was sent by B”.
The analysis of a cryptographic protocol using BAN starts with a set of initial beliefs. New
beliefs are added in the existing set of beliefs with each message sent and/or received. Inference
rules are applied to the existing set of beliefs to add new beliefs. If the final set of beliefs meet the
targeted goal, then the protocol is correct. A failure in meeting the targeted goal may suggest the
presence of a weakness in the security protocol.
BAN defines certain constructs for its framework and then uses postulates in order to derive its
conclusions. Some of the constructs are as follows:
P |≡ X : P believes X. This construct is central to the logic.
P C X : P sees X. It means that P received a message containing X from someone.
P |∼ X : P once said X. It means that P sent a message containing X.
](X) : The formula X is fresh.
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P |⇒ X : P has authority over X and should be trusted on this matter.
Examples of some of the postulates are given below:

P |≡ ](X), P |≡ Q |∼ X
P |≡ Q |≡ X

The above is a nonce-verification rule and it says that if a participant P believes that a message X
is fresh, and P believes that another participant Q said X, then P believes that Q believes X.
The jurisdiction rule says that if P believes that Q has jurisdiction over X, then P trusts Q on
the truth of X:
P |≡ Q |⇒ (X), P |≡ Q |≡ X
P |≡ X
The following rule states that P believes a set of statements if and only if P believes each
individual statement separately:
P |≡ X, P |≡ Y
P |≡ (X, Y)
Another rule is that if a principal sees a formula, then it also sees its components provided that
it knows the necessary keys:
P C (X, Y)
PCX
Similarly, the authors describe several other rules that allow one to derive new beliefs from
the previous beliefs when running a protocol. The part that went under strong criticism is when
BAN needs a protocol to be transformed into an idealized form before the start of the analysis. For
example, if the server sends a message containing the key KAB , then the corresponding formula is
A<

KAB

> B. This means that the key KAB is a good key for communication between A and B. A
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message in the idealized form is a formula. The entire protocol can be transformed into a set of
formulas that represent the intended behavior of the protocol. However, transforming a protocol in
an idealized form requires understanding some hidden protocol behaviors. This process involves
human intervention to an expert level.
BAN logic is a well known modal logic developed for the security protocol analysis. However,
BAN proved the authentication of Needham-Schroeder protocol [NS78], which was later discovered to be flawed by Lowe [Low96]. BAN uses guarantees provided by the pubic key signatures.
Lowe showed that the public key signatures are not enough to prove the authentication of the
Needham-Schroeder protocol. The weakness is a consequence of the inability of the BAN logic to
analyze security protocols to assure that private information remains private.
In addition to the lack of the model knowledge, one problem is pointed out by Nesset in
[Nes90]. Nesset shows with a simple example that BAN logic is capable of deducing characteristics about security protocols that by inspection are obviously false. Nesset took the following
protocol.
1 : A → B : {NA , KAB }KA−1
2 : B → A : {NB }KAB
This is represented in the idealized form as:
KAB

1 : A → B : {NA , A <
2 : B → A : {A <

KAB

> B}KA−1

> B}KAB

The analysis are then carried out as:
1 : B believes |

KA

2 : A believes A <

>A
KAB

>B
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3 : A believes f resh(A <

KAB

> B)

4 : B believes f resh(NA )
5 : B believes (A controls A <
6 : B sees {NA , A <

KAB

K

> B)

> B}KA−1

From 1, we can have 7 : B believes A said {NA , A <
From 4, we can have 8 : B believes A believes A <
Using 5, we get 9 : B believes A controls A <

KAB

Combining 8 and 9, we get 10 : B believes A <
For message 2, 11 : A sees {A <

KAB

KAB
KAB

> B}
>B

>B

KAB

>B

> B}KAB

From 2, we get 12 : A believes B said {A <

KAB

Using 3, we get 13 : A believes B believes A <

> B}
KAB

>B

In the above statements, 2, 8, 10, and 13 are used by BAN that this protocol can be used to
distribute cryptographic keys in a secure manner. However, this protocol is insecure as shown in
[Nes90].
Burrows et al. [BAN90b] defends by stating that Nesset’s example violates one of the assumptions of BAN. Mao and Boyd [MB93] claim that the method for determining assumptions in a
protocol is weak in the BAN logic. A slight modification to the assumptions could turn a useless
protocol into a valuable one or vice versa. Mao and Boyd also propose a procedure to formalize
BAN logic.
BAN attempts to model only belief and does not attempt to model knowledge. Therefore, it
can not be used to prove secrecy. BAN logic transforms the protocol into an idealized form but
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leaves idealization to intuition. BAN logic lacks semantics to model freshness. Abadi and Tuttle
define the semantics for the BAN logic in [AT91]. They also remove unnecessary assumptions by
introducing new constructs.
The BAN logic has been successful in finding flaws in some well known protocols such as
Andrew secure RPC handshake, and CCITT X.509. In addition, BAN has uncovered redundancy
in the NeedhamSchroeder conventional key, OtwayRees, Kerberos, Yahalom, Andrew RPC handshake, and the CCITT X.509 protocols. As such, BAN logic can be called a success. With BAN
logic, security objectives needs to be transformed into security properties and then verified using
the proposed logical framework. As mentioned above, this transformation requires human expertise. Furthermore, BAN logic is not powerful enough to encompass all of the security objectives.
For example, BAN is not able to cater secrecy.

2.1.3 Moser’s Approach
Moser presented a knowledge about knowledge and belief in [Mos89]. The proposed logic models
the dynamics of belief in cryptographic protocols. The presented logic is situation based where
a protocol is viewed as a finite sequence of actions performed by various principals at different
situations. Each action is viewed as a primitive term in the language. Moser’s logic facilitates the
ability to model the dynamic change of each principal’s beliefs at each step of the protocol within
a logic system.
The send and receive axioms defined in this approach read as:
1. sendi (M, s, d) ⇒ Bi (sendi , (M, s, d)) ∨ Bi (receive j (M, s, d)),
2. (receivei (M, s, d)) ⇒ Bi (receive j (M, s, d)).
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The first axiom states that an agent believes that the other agents receive each message that it sends
and it believes that it has indeed sent this message. The second axiom states that an agent who
receives a message believes that the other agents also receive it.
The presented logic is basically a non-monotonic logic of belief based on a combined monotonic logic of knowledge and belief. The non-monotonicity is provided by a unless operator that
enables one to express preference for beliefs and refutation of those beliefs. Although the theory presented is undecidable, the decision procedure given in for the un-quantified theory can still
be used as the basis for a practical proof system. It is clear that great value would also result
from combining the logic of knowledge and belief with a temporal logic. The author focuses on
knowledge of belief and addressing or translating security objectives remain unaddressed.

2.1.4

CKT5 and KPL

Bieber’s CKT5 [Bie90] and Syverson’s KPL [Syv90] reason about knowledge. CKT5 extends the
epistemic logic. CKT5 allows a user to describe the states of knowledge and ignorance associated
with the communication. This is done using encrypted messages. Bieber also extends the logic of
knowledge and time with operators that relate directly to the sending and receiving of messages.
In CKT5, modal operators have been added to extend the basic epistemic logic. These modal
operators express the transmission and receipt of messages.
In CKT5, the hostile environment is assumed. This means that if a message is intercepted by
an intruder, it may not arrive at its destination. In other words, messages are not lost, rather the
intruder can prevent them from reaching a target. In this approach, univoque messages are defined
such that, X knows that a message is usable if it is univoque. Furthermore, the author reasons in
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favor of knowledge rather than belief in order to guarantee security. he defends his argument by
making a case that epistemic logic is better at describing the behavior of other agents, as is seen by
a strong logic such as CKT5.
Snekkenes gives an example application of CKT5 in [Sne92]. He uses a protocol knows as KP,
which is similar to the Needham and Schroeder protocol. He modifies CKT5 in order to distinguish
between the role of a principal and its name. To achieve this, a predicate is introduced that maps
principals to their roles in a protocol. Unfortunately, KP can be proven secure using CKT5 and
hence points out the weakness of CKT5. This further demonstrates that strictly epistemic logic is
not sufficient for analyzing the security of authentication protocols.
Syverson’s use KPL [Syv90] to reason about the evolution of knowledge about words used in
the cryptographic protocols. KPL is a quantified modal logic with corresponding word interpretations. In the logics presented so far, we have seen ways of representing the fact that P knows
that KPQ is the secret key between P and Q. However, there has been no way to represent simply
the fact that the intruder Z knows P0 s key. Syverson calls this a key simpliciter. The KPL logic is
equipped to represent such a fact. KPL is a quantified modal logic with a corresponding possibleworlds interpretation. In KPL, Z knows P0 s key if P0 s key is present in all of the worlds accessible
to Z from his current set of possible worlds via some transition. Syverson defines a semantics
for the logic that he uses to prove the soundness and completeness of KPL. The soundness and
completeness of KPL do not guarantee that there can be no error in the reasoning about a secure
protocol, but they do prove that there can be no formal error [RH93]. Both CKT5 and KPL make
a distinction between seeing a message and understanding its significance.
The focus in these languages has been to represent knowledge or the evolution of knowledge.
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In this sense, these knowledge were more focussed on knowledge representation than devising
notions for security objectives. These objectives can be implicitly represented in these languages if
a formal mapping between these objectives and knowledge can be developed. However, this would
require the presence of an expert. Also the objectives will vary from environment to environment
and the expert will have to carefully translate the requirements in terms of knowledge between
different environments.

2.1.5 GNY Logic
Gong, Needham, and Yahalom extended the BAN logic to exclude universal assumptions and include some new notions like recognizability [GNY90]. It has vastly improved the BAN logic at the
expense of increased complexity. GNY has several rules for possessions and beliefs. It has a much
finer level of detail than BAN and can cover more types of protocol. GNY has become an area of
active research and several solutions have been proposed to automate the analysis process. GNY
facilitates automation but at the same time considered as a complex approach. The complexity may
cause significant weaknesses in the protocol analysis. Furthermore, the GNY approach addresses
only authentication.
GNY logic recognizes that belief and possession are different. This notion of recognition is a
very important contribution. In this extended logic, each principal maintains two sets. These sets
correspond to a belief set and a possession set. In addition to the basic constructs of the BAN logic,
GNY introduces the following additional constructs as explained in [RH93].
P C X: P is told formula X. P receives X, possibly after performing some computation such as
decryption. A formula being told can be the message itself, as well as any computable content of
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that message.
P 3 X: P possesses, or is capable of possessing formula X. At a particular stage of a run, this
includes all the formulas that P has been told, started the session with, or was able to compute for
formulas it already possesses.
φ(x): The formula X is recognizable. If P believes φ(x), then P would recognize X if P had certain
expectations about the nature of X.
P ∝ X: P is eligible to send formula X. A principal is only eligible to send something that it
possesses or can construct. P is eligible to send formula X. A principal is only eligible to send
something that it possesses or can construct.
The GNY logic performs a step-by-step approach towards protocol analysis. The GNY approach makes explicit assumptions and draws conclusions about the final position it attains. The
GNY logic is considered better than the BAN logic because it places a strong emphasis on the
separation between the content and the meaning of messages, which increases consistency in the
analysis. Moreover, GNY facilitates the ability to reason at more than one level. It equips the
recipient with the ability to identify the expected messages and deal with the replay attacks.
In [Gon91], Gong describe certain enhancements to the GNY logic. One problem with both
BAN and GNY logics is that they can lead to beliefs that do not preserve a causal relation. Another
problem with both BAN and GNY logics is that a specification that could not possibly represent a
real world situation can still be verified correct. For security objectives, this would imply proving
of a non existent objective.

20

2.1.6 Coffey and Saidha’s Approach
Coffey and Saidha combines the logic of belief and knowledge in [CP97]. The techniques that use
logic of belief are generally limited to the analysis of authentication protocols. On the other hand,
the techniques employing logic of knowledge lack flexibility in analyzing wide range of security
properties. The authors combine the logics of belief and knowledge to reason about public-key
cryptographic protocols. The axioms reflect the underlying assumptions of the logic and model the
low level properties of a cryptographic communication system. The low level properties include
the fundamental properties such as the ability of a principal to encrypt/decrypt. The deductive
reasoning is carried out by applying inference rules to the axioms. The inference rules are the
standard inferences required for natural deduction.
The proposed logic provides a means of verifying public-key cryptographic protocols. The
logic can analyze the evolution of both knowledge and belief during a protocol execution and is
therefore useful in addressing issues of both security and trust. The logic provides a belief operator and two knowledge operators. One knowledge operator is propositional and deals with the
knowledge of statements or facts. The other knowledge operator is a predicate and deals with the
knowledge of objects (e.g., cryptographic keys, ciphertext data, etc.). The inference rules provided in this scheme are the standard inferences required for the natural deduction. The axioms
of the logic are sufficiently low level to express the fundamental properties of the public-key cryptographic protocols. For example, the ability of a principal to encrypt/decrypt is based on the
knowledge of a cryptographic key. The axioms reflect the underlying assumptions of the logic and
are summarized below.
The authors define the communication environment to be hostile but maintain that the data
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communication system itself is reliable. They further assume that the cryptosystem is collisionfree. This means that it is not possible to create the same ciphertext from two different pieces of
plaintext. The logic incorporates the following rules of inference:
1. from ` p and ` (p → q) infer ` q,
2. generalization rules which state that if p is a theorem, then knowledge and belief in p are
also theorems,
3. from p ∧ q infer p,
4. from p and q infer p ∧ q,
5. from p infer p ∨ q,
6. from ∼∼ p infer p,
Coffey and Saidha’s logic allows the representation of both knowledge and belief, and is therefore capable of assessing the security and trustworthiness of a cryptographic protocol. Similar to
other logic based approaches, the security objectives need to be translated in the language and then
verified using certain constructs. If the same translated protocol is used in a different environment,
the security objectives might need to be translation again before verification.

2.1.7 Other Logic Based Approaches
Syverson and Van Oorschot applied the belief logic to include protocols such as Diffie-Hellman
in [SO94]. Mao and Boyd describe four weaknesses in the BAN logic and propose a new logic,
which is based on BAN in [MB93]. Mao and Boyd’s approach offers several improvements over
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BAN. Gaarder and Snekkenes [GS91] extend the BAN logic to analyze a public key cryptosystem
(PKCS). The authors of [CSP92] extend the BAN logic using probabilistic reasoning. Their approach calculates a measure of trust rather than the complete trust. The authors define the analysis
problem in terms of an equivalent linear programming problem.
The authors of [KG91] present a logic for reasoning about the evolution of belief within the
course of a protocol. Woo and Lam present a semantic model for the authentication protocols in
[WL93]. They identify correspondence and secrecy as two correctness properties. Correspondence
specifies that the different principals in a protocol must execute steps in a lockedstep fashion. This
represents the idea that a protocol step can be in response to a previous protocol step and not just
an independent event. The authors define an action schema to specify the steps in a protocol. In
the protocol specification, each of these actions is preceded by a label [RH93].
The objective of logic based approaches is to provide a sound and complete framework that can
be used to prove the correctness of security protocols. The emphasis has been to develop the syntax
and the semantics to represent the knowledge of belief and trust and evolution of knowledge. The
authors, who have worked in this area, have targeted the explicit notion of knowledge and have
built frameworks that use existing facts to build guarantees about certain conditions. Since these
approaches have not targeted security objectives primarily, these objectives need to be translated
into the proposed logical frameworks. This translation requires the presence of experts. Also,
an additional problem is to translate these objectives for every environment where the underlying
protocol is supposed to be deployed. This problem can be minimized if general purpose explicit
notions of security objectives are present in the logic based approaches.
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2.2

Theorem Proving

All formalism based strategies begin by expressing the cryptographic protocol in a formal notation
or model and then proving that the expressed model achieves its security goals. Theorem proving
is based on logic theories where logic is used along with a formal proof. Mathematical proof is
considered as the strongest argument to guarantee the correctness of a system. This method is build
upon traditional mathematical reasoning. Existing logical notations are utilized with the addition
of new notations to express the formal model into logic. Theorem proving techniques are applied
on the resulting model to prove its correctness. These proofs are complex, challenging, and require
the presence of mathematical experts.

2.2.1 Paulson’s Inductive Approach
L. C. Paulson presents a method based on the proof by induction in [Pau98]. Paulson’s inductive
approach relies on the concept of trace as a list of events occurred on the network during the course
of a protocol. Paulson’s approach is inherently algebraic in which traces are defined inductively.
An intruder is assumed and it has the access to all the traces. The intruder can decrypt messages
if it has the appropriate decryption key. Similarly, the intruder can send messages if it has the
appropriate encryption key. Proofs may be carried out by induction on generic trace of the model.
This establishes the trace properties that represent goals of the underlying cryptographic protocol.
The properties that the protocol must satisfy are proved by induction on all possible traces that
the protocol can generate. The properties need to be satisfied after each protocol’s step. The
interactive theorem prover Isabelle supports the inductive modelling of the protocol in the Higher
Order Language (HOL).
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In Isabelle traces are described as the sequence of events that could occur as the protocol agents
execute in a hostile environment. Traces are defined inductively from a set of rules that corresponds
to the possible actions of the agents including spies. Paulson uses inductive definitions that list the
possible actions, which can be performed by an agent or a system. The induction rule is used to
reason about the consequences of an arbitrary finite sequence of actions. The attacker is modeled
using the inductively defined operators analz and synth.The operator partsH represents the set of
all components of H that can be obtained from it. The set analzH represents the most that could
be obtained from H without breaking ciphers. The set synthH represents the set of messages a
penetrator can build up from the elements of H. Only the known messages (or elements) can be
used to build up new messages.
A protocol is described in terms of events of different forms. Two forms of events in a trace
are defined: Says A B X and Notes A X, which means that A sends message X to B and A internally
stores X respectively. Three additional rules are defined in order to capture the notion of an empty
trace (an empty list []). These rules are:
• Fake messages. For example, X ∈ synth(analzH) is a fraudulent message,
• B , Spy then Says Spy B X, and
• Accidents (if S distributed the session key K in a run involving the nonces Na and Nb, then
Notes S py {Na, Nb, K}).
Induction is applied on the set of traces. For the set of traces, the induction principle says that
P(evs) holds for each trace evs provided that the property P is preserved under all rules of creating
traces. P[] is proved to cover the empty trace. For each of the other rules, an assertion of the form
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P(evs) ⇒ P(ev#evs) is proved where event ev containing the new message, is added to the trace
evs.
The requirements to check a security property of a protocol is given in a syntax identical to
that used to model the protocol. For instance, in the case of the Needham-Schroeder public-key
protocol, the requirement may be that if an initiator A sends the nonce Na to the responder B in its
first message and receives the second message back that contains Na , then B must have sent this
message. Paulson’s method places no limit on the number of instances and an arbitrary number
of instances can be considered with this approach. This is all because of the inductive nature of
this approach. However, being a theorem prover, it can not generate counterexamples in case of a
failure and there is no guarantee of termination. Isabelle is a generic theorem prover typically used
in an interactive fashion. It supports formal reasoning in a number of object logics including HOL.
The translation of security objectives in HOL requires human interaction. Furthermore, there
are no explicit rules that adjust these objectives as they move from one environment to another.
Objectives such as availability, can exhaust the theorem prover and it might end without creating a
counterexample. A well defined representation for security objectives will solve this problem.

2.2.2 Other Theorem Proving Approaches
Kindred and Wing proposed a general theorem proving approach known as theory checking [KW99].
The proposed approach attempts to improve the automated support for using small logics. The authors exhaustively produce all truths in the protocol. They verify that properties hold and explore
what effect changes in the protocol will have on the truths generated. They build a logic checker
and verify that a logic satisfies certain restrictions.
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PVS (Prototype Verification System), developed at the Computer Science Laboratory of SRI
(Stanford Research International) provides support for formal specification and verification. It
consists of a specification language, a number of predefined theories, a theorem prover, various
utilities, documentation, and examples that illustrate different methods of using the system in several application areas [ORS92]. The language of PVS is based on the strongly typed higher-order
logic. The PVS theorem prover provides a collection of inference rules that are applied interactively under user guidance within a sequent calculus framework. User-defined procedures can
combine these inferences to yield higher-level proof strategies. PVS also provides some integration
with model-checking.

2.3

Model Checking

Once a formal model of a system has been established; model checking can be utilized to establish
the accuracy of the system. Model checking is an alternative resort to theorem proving. A model
checker is a tool that explores the state space of the model to determine if there are any paths
through the space that correspond to any successful attack.
There are several advantages associated with model checkers. Model checkers help detect
bugs in the early stages of development. This advantage helps reducing the overall development
life cycle time. An automated document producer can be associated with a model checker that
can produce a documentation of the whole process including the attacks and the states that lead to
an attack. Model checkers are clear, complete, and can be used to perform consistency checking
and testing. In order to verify security objectives, model checkers need these objectives to be
transformed into properties and then given as an input. A change in the environment will require
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the model checkers to separately analyze the protocol under different environment variables. On
the other hand, model checkers can loop forever while proving a property. This is because of the
existence of the state space explosion problem associated with the model checkers.

2.3.1 Longley-Rigby Tool
Longley-Rigby tool [LR92] is a search tool to find a subtle and previously unknown flaw in a
hierarchical key management scheme. The approach used in Longley-Rigby tool is similar to that
of the Interrogator [MC87]. The main difference between Longley-Rigby tool and Interrogator is
that the former have relied upon human intervention to assist in the search. In Longley-Rigby tool,
if the system indicates that a word cannot be found by the penetrator, the user can intervene and
determine whether or not that is likely to be the case. On the other hand, if the word is indicated to
be accessible, this information can be inserted into the database and the search can proceed.
Longley and Rigby use a rule based system that transforms goals into subgoals and can constantly continue this process. They use this rule based scheme to build a tree. In this tree, each
node represents a data item. The children of a node represent those data items that are required
for the knowledge of the data represented by the father node. In this way, the authors are able to
construct a tree in which the root node represents the data required by the intruder for an attack
(e.g., a cryptographic key), and the leaves represent those data items that are required to know the
root item. The Longley and Rigby tool allows the user to interact with the system. The user can
determine whether a data can or cannot be found by the intruder. If the data is judged to be accessible, this information can be inserted into the system and the generation of the tree can proceed.
Longley and Rigby managed to find a subtle and previously unknown flaw in a hierarchical key

28

management scheme.
Expert systems developed specifically for the analysis of cryptographic protocols are more
successful than general purpose tools. However, they are often inefficient because they perform
an exhaustive search. Sometimes they do not even halt and the results are inconclusive. To cope
with these problems, they require human intervention. On the other hand, their advantage is that if
they discover a flaw, then the attack scenario that exploits the flaw is directly available. Because of
the presence of an exhaustive search, the verification of security objectives such as availability is
difficult. This means that an additional provision is needed to model the denial-of-service attacks.

2.3.2 Interrogator
One of the earliest systems to utilize Dolev-Yao’s model is the Interrogator [MC87]. The Interrogator is a software tool that takes the protocol specification and a target data item as its input
[KMM94]. The tool then performs an exhaustive search to find flaws. The Interrogator models
the protocol participants as communicating state machines. The Interrogator assumes the presence
of a penetrator who can destroy, modify, and create messages. The tool then attempts to find a
state in which the penetrator knows some secret. The output is a message history showing how the
penetrator obtained the secret.
In the Interrogator, the protocol participants are modeled as communicating state machines
whose messages to each other are intercepted by the intruder who can either destroy messages,
modify them, or let them pass through unmodified. Given a final state, in which the intruder knows
some word which should be secret, the Interrogator tries all possible ways to construct a path by
which that state can be reached. If it finds such a path, then a security flaw is identified. The
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Interrogator has not yet found a previously unknown attack on a cryptographic protocol. However,
it has been able to reproduce a number of known attacks.

2.3.3 NRL Protocol Analyzer
The NRL Protocol Analyzer [Mea94] is based on the Dolev-Yao model. A specification in the NRL
protocol analyzer is modeled on the communication of honest participants. Dishonest participants
are assumed to be modeled by the intruder and so are not modeled separately. The NRL employs a
strategy similar to that of the Interrogator and the Longley-Rigby tool. In the Interrogator, one uses
the tool to find protocol security flaws by specifying an insecure state and attempting to construct
a path to that state from an initial state. In NRL, an unlimited number of protocol rounds are
allowed in a single path, which make the state space infinite. THE NRL focuses not only on
finding paths that are insecure but on proving that these states are unreachable. The NRL allows
human intervention, which is necessary when proofs lead into infinite states.
Moreover, in NRL protocol analyzer, each participant of the protocol contains its own local
state. The global state of the system is simply the composition of these local states with some state
information for the environment or the penetrator. Each participant maintains some learned facts
lfacts in its local store. For example, if a user A attempts to initiate a conversation with a user B
during a local round N at the time T , then the corresponding lfact is represented as follows.

l f act(user(A), N, init conv, T ) = [user(B)]

Similarly, if a user B receives a message X during a local round S at the time P apparently from the
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user A attempting to initiate a conversation, then the corresponding lfact is represented as follows.

l f act(user(B), S , rcvd init conv, P) = [user(A), X]

The NRL protocol analyzer uses unification in which an incomplete state description represents
a set of states. The steps of the protocol are represented as conditional rewriting rules and the goals
are formalized as un-reachability theorems.
The NRL protocol analyzer defines a set of requirements using some pre-defined actions that
specifies a class of protocols. For instance, consider the following requirement that contains two
conditions:
• ¬( accept(B, A, M, N) ∧  learn(Z, M))
• accept(B, A, M, N)) → (send(A, B, (Query, M)) ∧  request(B, A, Query, N))
The first condition says that if the participant B accepted a message M from the participant A at
some point in the past (the past time operator ), then the intruder did not learn M at some point
in the past. Second condition says that if B accepted message M from A in B’s local round N then
A sent M to B as a response to a query at B’s local round N.
After the transition rules are defined for honest agents and the operations available to all agents
are described, the atoms needs to be defined that serves as the basic building block of the words in
the protocol. Finally, the rewrite rules are described. An example of a rewrite rule is given below,
which says that encryption and decryption with the same key are self canceling.
rr1 : pke(privkey(X), pke(pubkey(X), Y)) ⇒ Y
rr2 : pke(pubkey(X), pke(privkey(X), Y)) ⇒ Y
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The tool needs high level of expert user interaction. It performs backward search from some
insecure state. If the initial state is found, then the path to the initial state represents the counterexample. The NRL has been used to find flaws in protocols by generating paths to insecure states.
It has been used to find an authentication flaw in the Simmons’ Selective Broadcast protocol and
a flaw in the Burns and Mitchell’s Resource Sharing Protocol. Since the state space of NRL is
infinite, modeling availability attacks is difficult.

2.3.4 FDR
In FDR (Failures Divergence’s Refinement) checker, the protocol and the property are described
as CSP processes. FDR then verifies whether the property is a refinement of the protocol [Low97].
The simplest notion of refinement is a trace model. If traces of a program P are a subset of traces
of a property T , then the program P refines the property T . The expression of the property and the
program could be in different languages. For example, the program can be described as a set of
states and a state transition function. The property can be expressed in terms of a logical formula.
An exhaustive search can be used to check that the logical formula holds at every state.
FDR is a general purpose tool that was initially used to analyze many sorts of systems including
distributed databases and communications protocols. It has been used to test whether the protocol
correctly achieves authentication and discovers a specific kind of attack on the protocol. On a large
scale system, the performance of FDR is constrained under user-specified limits. The failure to
find an attack in the large scale systems only asserts that an attack can not be found within the
user-specified limits.
In order to exemplify the method, we take the example of the Needham-Schroeder (NS) public-
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key protocol. Assume the set Initiator represents initiators, and the set Responder represents responders, Key represents public keys, and Nonce represents nonces. Also assume a, a0 ∈ Initiator, b ∈
Responder, k ∈ Key, na , nb ∈ Nonce. Then the three messages in NS protocol can be represented
using three sets of communication events as follows.

MS G1 , {Msg1.a.b.Encrypt.k.na .a0 }
MS G2 , {Msg2.b.a.Encrypt.k.na .nb }
MS G3 , {Msg3.a.b.Encrypt.k.nb }
MS G , MS G1 ∪ MS G2 ∪ MS G3

The channels are defined as follows. “channel comm, f ake, intercept : MS G” represent the
standard communication channel, intruder’s faking messages, and the intruder’s interception of
messages. These channels assumes MS G as their type. Moreover, additional channels “channel
user, session, I running, R running, I commit, R commit : Initiator.Responder” are the channels
of the type Initiator.Responder that represent a user’s request to connect the initiator and the
responder, a session channel, initiator’s taking part in a run of the protocol, responder’s taking
part in a run of the protocol, initiator committing to a session, and the responder committing to a
session respectively.
A CSP process INIT IAT OR(a, na ) represents an initiator with an identity a and a nonce na .
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Without intruder action, this process is defined as follows.

INIT IAT OR(a, na ) , user.a?b → I running.a.b →
comm!Msg1.a.b.Encrypt.key(b).na .a →
comm.Msg2.b.a.Encrypt.key(a)?n0a .nb →
i f na = n0a then comm!Msg3.a.b.Encrypt.key(b).nb →
I commit.a.b → session.a.b → S kip
else S top

Now renaming is applied in order to cater the intruder who can intercept messages 1s and 3s
and can fake messages 2s. The resulting initiator is given as follows.

INIT IAT OR1(a, na ) , INIT IAT OR(A, Na )
[[comm.Msg1 ← comm.Msg1, comm.Msg1 ← intercept.Msg1,
comm.Msg2 ← comm.Msg2, comm.Msg2 ← f ake.Msg2,
comm.Msg3 ← comm.Msg3, comm.Msg3 ← intercept.Msg3]]

The responder can also be defined similarly. The intruder is defined such that it can fake all the
messages using its knowledge base. It can also intercept all the message and learn new nonces if it
possesses the right decryption key.
In order to test whether any protocol meets its authentication goal, FDR takes two inputs,
a specification and an implementation. FDR then tests whether the implementation refines the
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specification. The system is defined as the parallel composition of the agents and the intruder
synchronizing on the set of channels. The system is represented as follows:

AGENT S , INIT IAT OR1|[{|comm, session.A.B|}]|RES PONDER1,
S YS T EM , AGENT S |[{| f ake, comm, intercept|}]|INT RUDER.

The above mentioned system represents parallel composition of all the processes in the system.
Running the system results into several traces. Now, it needs to be verified that each trace of
the implementation is also a trace of the specification. The specification for authentication of a
responder AR is given as:

AR0 , R running.A.B → I commit.A.B → AR0
A1 , {|R running.A.B, I commit.A.B|}
AR , AR0 |||RUN(Σ\A1 )

AR0 means that an I commit.A.B event should only occur after an R running.A.B event. If Σ is the
set of all events, then AR0 |||RUN(Σ\A1 ) represents occurring of all events in an arbitrary order. The
above specification says that the initiator A commits to a session with the responder B only if the
responder has really taken part in the protocol run. FDR can now be used to verify that SYSTEM
refines AR, indicating that the protocol correctly authenticates the responder.
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2.3.5 MurΦ
The authors of [MMS97] devised a general-purpose state enumeration tool, named MurΦ (pronounced as ”Mur-phi”), to analyze security protocols. The approach used by MurΦ is similar to
the approach used in CSP model checking of cryptographic protocols. It involves modeling the
protocol and the desired properties in the Φ language. MurΦ uses breadth-first or depth-first full
state enumeration to verify that all reachable states of the system satisfy the specification.
The analyzing methodology of MurΦ involves the following successive steps: formulate the
protocol, add an adversary to the system, state the desired correctness condition, run the protocol
for some specific choice of system size parameters, experiment with alternate formulations, and
repeat. MurΦ has been used to demonstrate flaws already known as TMN and Kerberos version
5. In MurΦ, it is feasible to modify a system description to reflect a situation where one or more
pieces of secret information have been compromised.
The Murφ language is a high-level language for describing nondeterministic finite-state machines. First the protocol is modeled in this language, and then the desired properties to be verified
is specified by the invariants, which are boolean conditions that have to be true in every reachable
state. The state showing the violation of the invariant contributes the flaw in the protocol. Lets
take the example of the NS public-key protocol and see its model in murφ. The data structure for
the initiator is given below.
const
NumInitiators: 1;
type
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InitiatorId: scalarset (NumInitiators);
InitiatorStates: enum{I_SLEEP,I_WAIT,I_COMMIT};
Initiator: record
state: InitiatorStates;
responder: AgentId;
end;
var
ini: array [InitiatorId] of Initiator;
The state of each initiator is stored in the array ini. I_SLEEP, I_WAIT, and I_COMMIT
represent that the initiator has not started the protocol, the initiator has started the protocol, and
the initiator is committing the protocol respectively. The behavior of an initiator is modeled by
two murφ rules. In the first rule, the initiator starts the protocol by sending the first message of
the NS protocol and changes its local state from I_SLEEP to I_WAIT. The second rule models the
reception and checking of the second message of the NS protocol, and then commit (I_WAIT to
I_COMMIT) and send the final message.
Finally the invariants represents the correctness specification of the protocol as follows.
invariant "responder correctly authenticated"
forall i: InitiatorId do
ini[i].state = I_COMMIT &
ismember(ini[i].responder, ResponderId)
->
res[ini[i].responder].initiator = i &
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( res[ini[i].responder].state = R_WAIT |
res[ini[i].responder].state = R_COMMIT )
end;
It says that for each initiator i, if it is committed to a session with a responder, this responder (with
the identifier stored in ini[i].responder) must have started the protocol with the initiator i, i.e,
have stored i in its field initiator and be in state R_WAIT or R_COMMIT. The intruder maintains a
set of overheard messages and an array of all known nonces. Three rules represent an intruder: one
for overhearing and intercepting messages, one for replaying messages from the set of overheard
messages, and one for generating messages using the known nonces and injecting them into the
network.

2.3.6 Brutus
The authors of [CJM00b] devised a special-purpose tool Brutus for analyzing security protocols.
The approach of Brutus separate the intruder from the model. The intruder is encoded as a set
of rewrite rules that can be applied to messages sent during the execution of the protocol. Brutus
contains a state exploration tool and message derivation engine. The state exploration tool performs
the search. The message derivation engine uses the rewrite rules to model the intruder capabilities.
Thee state exploration tool and message derivation engine interact with each other. In addition
to the components, a specification language is provided, which is powerful enough to describe
a variety of security properties. The language can be used to specify what information should be
kept secret and what should be known to the specific participants. The authors applied partial order
reductions in [CJM00a] to address the state space explosion problem.
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Brutus uses some rules to define message derivability relation in order to model the capabilities
of the adversary. A protocol is modeled as an asynchronous composition of a set of named communicating processes, which model the honest agents and the penetrator. Brutus makes the model
finite by placing a bound on the number of sessions (number of times a principal may attempt to
execute the protocol). Each session is modeled as a principal instantiating some role in the protocol, called an instance. Each instance is described as a separate copy or instantiation of a principal
and consists of a single execution of the sequence of actions, which makes up that agent’s role in
the protocol along with all the variable bindings and knowledge acquired during the execution. A
principal can have multiple instances but each instance is executed once. The entire model for the
protocol is obtained by combining these instances with a single instance of the adversary. A trace
is defined as each possible execution of the model and can be obtained from a finite alternating
sequence of global states and actions. Two kinds of actions are defined: send, and receive. In
addition, user-defined actions are defined as well.
In order to specify properties of a protocol, Brutus uses first-order logic in the model. Modal
logic is also combined with the predicate logic in order to capture the notion of the past-time
operator. In this way, one can use the past-time operator to talk about the things that happened
in the history of a particular protocol’s run. The atomic propositions of the logic allow to refer to
the bindings of variables in the model to actions that occur during execution of the protocol, and
to the knowledge of the different agents participating in the protocol. The logic used, can be seen
as a variant of the linear-time temporal logic with the past-time operator where one can express
actions and knowledge. After the protocol is modeled, the model checker runs and checks the
desired specifications in each of its states. Like any model checker, it gives the trace of the run (a
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counterexample) whenever any state does not meet the specification.

2.3.7

Athena

Athena [SBP01] is a model checker that is based on the Strand Space Model (SSM) of [FHG98].
Athena formally reduces the infinite-state-space problem into a finite-state-space problem, which
can be verified using model checking. Hence, for a well-formed formula, w f f , if the evaluation
procedure terminates, then it will generate a counterexample if the formula is false, or provide a
proof if the formula is true. Although the evaluation procedure is not guaranteed to terminate, experience shows that it does terminate for many useful protocols. In those cases when the procedure
does not terminate for arbitrary configurations of the protocol execution, termination can always
be forced by bounding the number of concurrent protocol runs and the length of messages. This is
similar to the bounds in current model checkers such as FDR, MurΦ, and Brutus.
Athena also exploits several state space reduction techniques.
1. The state transition is not asynchronously composed of independent process transitions,
hence, avoid the state space explosion caused by asynchronous composition.
2. The state structures and state transitions capture exact causal relations, hence, achieve compact and efficient state representations.
3. Athena takes advantage of the symbolic state transitions, instead of an explicit state search,
by allowing a state to contain free variables. A state s(x) with free term variables, x, represents a class of variable free states, {[σx]s(x)}.
A state transition between two states, which contain free variables represents a set of state tran40

sitions between two variable-free states. Thus, Athena can represent states and state transitions
much more efficiently. As a special case of this, it naturally avoids the symmetry redundancy problem. Finally, Athena uses backward search instead of forward search. With forward search, all the
participating principals have to be pre-stated. The approach of Athena starts with a simple initial
strand and then add new strands only when necessary according to the exact causal relations. These
techniques greatly reduce the state space that needs to be explored comparing with other current
approaches. Athena also has the advantage that it can easily incorporate results from theorem
proving through un-reachability theorems. By using the un-reachability theorems, authors prune
the state space at an early stage, hence, reduce the state space explored even further and increase
the likelihood of termination.
To evaluate a w f f formula of the form, ∀.C. f , the authors define a lemma. The lemma states
that if H is an algorithm that decides the validity of any w f f of the form ∀.C. f1 ⇒ f2 , in a model
M in finite steps, where f1 is a conjunction and f2 is a disjunction of the atomic propositions, then
there exists an algorithm to evaluate any formula of the form ∀.C.F in the model M in finite steps,
for any propositional formula F. The authors then formulate their verification procedure in terms
of a proof search in a very specialized proof system.
Athena first transforms the security property to be verified into an initial sequent, which contains an initial state. It then applies a small set of inference rules with certain decision procedures
to the states, building a proof tree until it either completes the proof or refutes a sequent. In the latter case, Athena reports the protocol to be incorrect and the state of the refuted sequent represents
a counterexample or a successful attack on the protocol. One main difference between Athena and
previous approaches is that Athena uses fundamentally different representation of protocol execu41

tions. Instead of the finite state verifications techniques described before, Athena uses an extension
to SSM, a much more compact state structure based on semi-bundles and goal-bindings. The goalbinding is the causal relation  that captures the exact information about the origins of messages
in a protocol execution. A set of protocol runs that differ only in the order of interleaving executions of individual parties is in fact represented by one state in Athena. Athena can reason about
all such executions simultaneously. This form of the state structure allows to develop efficient
state search procedures avoiding the exponential growth of the state space due to an asynchronous
composition.

2.4

Other Approaches

2.4.1 Dolev and Yao
The authors of [DEk82, DY83] contributed the early work in the application of formal methods to
verify cryptographic protocols. Dolev and Yao’s work [DY83] is significant as it proposed the first
algebraic model for the security of protocols and encompassed the capabilities of the penetrator.
Dolev and Yao’s model assumes and intruder who can create, destroy, read, and alter messages.
The intruder can also perform encryption and decryption operations that are available to legitimate
users of the network. The authors assume perfect encryption.
The authors suggest the following two conditions to be necessary in order to assure the security
of the cascade protocols:
1. The messages transmitted between two participants must contain some layers of encryption
functions.
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2. In generating a reply message, each participant A never applies decryption function DA without also applying encryption function E A .
Similarly, for a two party name stamp protocol T , the authors define that T is insecure if a
string γ ∈ V ∗ Ni (X, Y) exists such that γ = λ. Here, V is the string of operators that an intruder can
apply on any message, and Ni (X, Y) is the sequence of texts transmitted between X and Y when X
wishes to send plaintext M to Y. Otherwise, T is defined to be secure. Consider the following two
party name stamp protocol:
1. X → Y: (X, Ey (Ey (M)X), Y)
2. Y → X: (Y, E x (E x (M)Y), X)
The authors have proven this protocol to be flawed. For the above mentioned protocol, the sequence of operators applied by the participant X in the first message is equal to N1 (X, Y) = EY iX EY .
That is, the participant X first applies encryption EY (using Y’s public key) on message M, then
appends his own id X (append operation iX ), and finalizes the message by applying the encryption operation EY again. Similarly, in the second message the participant Y applies the operators N2 (X, Y) = E X iY E X . The authors also defined additional operators such as d for deleting an id from a string, dX for deleting a known id X from a string, and DX for the decryption
using X’s private key. The attack on this protocol exists as the authors found the string γ =
DZ dDZ EZ iX EZ DX dZ DX E X iZ dDZ dDZ EZ iX EZ DX dZ DX E X iZ N2 (X, Y) ∈ V ∗ Ni (X, Y) such that γ = λ.
γ simply represents the sequence of operators a saboteur applies on a protocol message resulting
into a null string. In this way, a saboteur can obtain the secret plaintext from an encrypted message.
The proposed model is extremely limited. It can only be used to detect failures of secrecy.
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The suggested model does not allow the participants to remember their state information as they
move from one state to another. However, the proposed model is significant because it was the
first formal model to represent multiple executions of a protocol. Most of the work done in formal
analysis of security protocols is inspired from Dolev and Yao’s model. Dolev and Yao define
some classes of protocols. They reason about these classes of protocols rather than the individual
protocols themselves. In addition, they prove certain interesting properties of these classes.

2.4.2 Kemmerer’s Work
Kemmerer models cryptographic protocols as communicating state machines [Kem89]. The protocols are modeled in a specification language. The specification language has an attached theorem
prover. Because of this attached theorem prover, it is possible to use the prover to prove theorems
about the security of the specified protocols. The security is proved by defining security properties
as state invariants and proving that these invariants are preserved by each transition.
Kemmerer uses an extension of the first-order predicate calculus, a formal specification language called Ina Jo. Ina Jo was designed as a general purpose tool to support software development
and correctness proofs. Kemmerer describes an example security system and then gives an Ina Jo
specification of it. He also specifies critical requirements that the system is to satisfy in all states.
Once the specification is complete, Ina Jo generates theorems that can be used to verify whether the
critical requirements are satisfied or not. Kemmerer un-covers a weakness in his sample system.
The value of this method is limited because the specification of the critical requirements needs that
the designer knows the potential attacks in advance. This in turn makes the translation of security
objectives in Ina Jo a difficult process.
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2.4.3 Type Checking
Abadi proposed type checking [Aba99], which is an approach towards protocol analysis. This approach has a potential disadvantage of defining security violations in terms of type inconsistencies.
Hence, the security requirements must be considered when the specifications are being written.
Another approach [AG99] is to develop a computational model. A formal system is also developed and a proof of soundness is established for the system using the computational model. This
work develops a method for the static checking of secrecy properties of programs written in a minimal but expressive programming language, the spi-calculus. These programs can be concurrent
and can use cryptography. The method is embodied in a set of typing rules. The principles and
rules developed are neither necessary nor sufficient for security. They are not necessary because
like most practical static type-checking disciplines, this is incomplete. They are not sufficient because they ignore all security issues other than secrecy, and also because they do not account for
how to implement the spi-calculus while preserving secrecy properties. However, these principles
and rules provide some useful guidelines.
In this approach, encryption keys are pieces of data, and as such they are labeled. The result
of encrypting secret data under a secret key can be made public but only with some precautions.
For example, given a secret bit b and a secret key K, we cannot simply publish b under K. If we
may also publish 0 or 1 under K, an attacker could deduce the value of b by comparing ciphertexts.
The rules of this paper capture a sufficient set of simple precautions that permit the publication of
ciphertexts that contain secrets. The approach relies on a binary view of secrecy according to which
the world is divided into a system and an attacker. A finer model could distinguish the individual
principals and groups within the system. It could also permit a declassification operation whereby
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a principal can reduce the secrecy level of the data that it owns. The typing system does not allow
comparisons between terms of level. The typing system may be relaxed to allow such operations
in cases where their outcomes are not revealed on the public channels.

2.4.4

Strand Space Model

In [FHG99], a strand is defined as a sequence of events that a participant may engage in a protocol. A strand represents either a protocol execution by a legitimate party (regular strand) or by a
penetrator (penetrator strand). A strand space is a set of strands, consisting of strands of various
legitimate protocol parties, together with the penetrator strands. In SSM, each participant of the
security protocol is represented by a strand and the individual run of each participant is captured by
the traces of these strands. The correctness claims for the protocol are then expressed in terms of
connections between different kinds of strands. In the following lines, we describe the basic Strand
Space Model (SSM) terminologies that are necessary to understand the motivation and intuition
behind strategies based on SSM.
The set of actions, that a participant may take during the execution of a protocol includes
actions such as send, (denoted by +) and receive (denoted by -). Let M be the set of possible
messages that can be exchanged by all the participants in a protocol. A signed term is a pair hσ, ui
with σ ∈ {+, −} and u ∈ M. A signed term h+, ui represents the sending of a message u and is
typically written as +u. Similarly, −u, represents the reception of a message u. The set of finite
sequence of signed terms is represented as (±M)∗ . A strand space over M consists of a set Σ, whose
elements are called strands, together with a trace mapping tr : Σ → (±M)∗ . The trace mapping tr
associates each strand in Σ with a sequence of signed terms.

46

A node is a pair hs, ii with s ∈ Σ, and i is an integer with 1 ≤ i ≤ |tr(s)|. The set of all the
nodes is donated by N. For a node n = hs, ii, where tr(s) = hσ1 , u1 i...hσk , uk i, term(n) is defined
as hσi , ui i. There is an edge n1 →n2 if and only if term(n1 ) = +a and term(n2 ) = −a for some a ∈
M. The edge → represents a potential causal link between two strands. When n1 = hs, ii and n2
= hs, i + 1i are nodes, then there is an edge n1 ⇒n2 . The edge ⇒ indicates that n1 is an immediate
causal predecessor of n2 . In a similar fashion, n0 ⇒+ n implies that n0 precedes n (not necessarily
immediately) on the same strand. A term t occurs in n ∈ N if and only if t @ term(n). The node
n ∈ N is an entry point for the term t if term(n) = +t and whenever n0 ⇒+ n, term(n0 ) < term(n).
A term t originates on n ∈ N if and only if n is an entry point for t. A term t uniquely originates if
and only if t originates on a unique n ∈ N. It can be seen that N, together with both sets of edges
n1 → n2 and n1 ⇒n2 , is a directed graph hN, (→

S

⇒i.

A bundle represents a full protocol exchange. It consists of a number of strands hooked together
where one strand sends a message and another strand receives the same message. Intuitively, a
bundle is a portion of a strand space large enough to represent at least a full protocol exchange.
Bundle has a natural causal precedence relation relative to which inductive arguments are carried
out. A bundle is a finite acyclic subgraph that captures the natural causal precedence relation
among nodes as defined by the edges → and ⇒. For a given strand space Σ, let B = hNB , (→B
S

⇒B i be a subgraph of hN, (→

S

⇒i. The graph B is a bundle if:

1. B is finite,
2. if n2 ∈ NB and term(n2 ) is negative, then there is a unique n1 such that n1 →B n2 ,
3. if n2 ∈ NB and n1 ⇒ n2 , then n1 ⇒B n2 ,
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4. B is acyclic.
The bundle-height of a strand is the largest i such that hs, ii ∈ bundle.
The set T ⊆ M is the set of texts (representing the atomic messages). The set K ⊆ M contains
cryptographic keys disjoint from T . The term {g}k ∈ M represents the encryption of the term g ∈ T
using k ∈ K. The subterm relation @ is inductively defines as the smallest relation such that:
1. any term m ∈ M is a subterm of itself,
2. a term m ∈ M is a subterm of {g}k , if m is a subterm of g,
3. a term m ∈ M is a subterm of gh, if m is a subterm of g or h.
The detailed explanation of the concepts introduced in this Section can be found in [FHG99].

2.5 Summary
All formalism based strategies begin by expressing the cryptographic protocol in a formal notation or model and then proving that the expressed model achieves its security goals. We have
categorized the verification process in three major categories; logic based approaches, theorem
proving, and model checking. Logic based approaches utilize modal logic to reason about knowledge and belief about messages in a distributed system. The goal of logic based analysis is to infer
or prove the correctness condition of the protocol. Theorem proving approaches employ mathematical proofs, which are considered as the strongest argument to guarantee the correctness of a
system. This method is build upon the traditional mathematical reasoning. In model checking, a
formal model of a system is established and then finite state verification is performed to establish
the accuracy of the system.
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The logic based approaches has emphasized syntax and semantics to represent knowledge of
belief and trust and evolution of knowledge. These approaches were not targeting security objectives primarily. Hence, these objectives need to be translated into the proposed logical frameworks.
This translation requires expert human interaction. An additional problem is to translate these objectives for every environment where the underlying protocol is supposed to be deployed. This
problem can be minimized if general purpose explicit notions of security objectives are present in
the logic based approaches. The translation of security objectives in theorem provers requires human interaction. Furthermore, there are no explicit rules that adjust these objectives as they move
from one environment to another. Objectives such as availability, can exhaust a theorem prover
and it might end without creating a counterexample. A well defined representation for security
objectives will solve this problem. Model checkers help detect bugs in the early stages of development. Model checkers are clear and helpful in testing and consistency checking. At the same time,
they suffer from the state space explosion. This problem may prevent a model checker to provide
a correctness proof about a security protocol.
In this chapter, we have discussed many formal approached that have been utilized for the
analysis of security protocols. An interesting observation is that most of these approaches are
not targeting the security objectives. Instead, they are focussed on a specific sub problem that
will be used to solve a bigger problem. We state that ignoring security objectives in designing
formal tools may make it difficult to verify protocols with evolving requirements and operating in
different environments. An explicit notion of security objectives will not only increase protocol
portability across different platforms, it will also make a language/tool more marketable, reliable,
and complete in terms of addressing different security requirements.
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CHAPTER 3
SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN WLANS

Many standards with varying levels of security have been developed for WLANs. IEEE ratified the
802.11 standard, also known as Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi), for WLANs in 1997 [IEE99]. In order
to provide security, a scheme known as Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) was used in the 802.11
standard. Many vulnerabilities were discovered in WEP [CHW03][FMS01][MRH04][PD03] that
motivated the researchers to design a new security mechanism for WLANs. IEEE addresses the
problems of WEP in a new amendment known as IEEE 802.11i [IEE04a].
802.11i introduces a range of new security features such as Robust Security Network (RSN),
which are designed to overcome the shortcomings of WEP and provide additional security measures. RSN is defined as a wireless security network that allows the creations of Robust Security
Network Associations (RSNAs) only. RSNAs are wireless connections that provide moderate to
high levels of assurance against WLAN security threats through the use of a variety of cryptographic techniques [Nat06]. The three types of RSN components are Station (STA), Access Point
(AP), and Authentication Server (AS). The STAs are wireless endpoint devices such as laptops.
The APs are network devices that allow STAs to communicate with each other or with a network
such as an Internet, without a physical wired connection. STAs and APs were also present in
the earlier WLANs. The AS is a new component introduced by the RSN framework to provide
authentication services to the STAs.
This chapter is organized as follows. We present the importance of using security objectives
and the threats that result when these objectives are violated in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 describes
the initial measures taken by the IEEE 802.11 standard to meet its security objectives and their
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effectiveness. In Section 3.3, we discuss how 802.11i addresses its security objectives.

3.1 Security Policy and Security Objectives
A security policy is a set of rules that govern activities for the resources belonging to an organization. In a computing environment, these rules govern activities such as device security, administrative controls, network security, etc. The security policy much define what is to be protected and
what are the expectations of the system users. This policy is very important as it provides the basis
for security planning when new applications are designed or the current network is expanded. In
order to define a security policy, definition of security objectives is necessary. Security objectives
address areas such as resource protection, authentication and authorization, integrity, etc.

3.1.1 Importance of using Security Objectives
The work done in the area of formal verification lacks an explicit notion of security objectives.
This is because the focus has been on the inclusion of explicit notions for knowledge of trust,
knowledge of belief, and evolution of knowledge as described in detail in Chapter 2. We introduce
an explicit notion of security objectives for the formal verification approaches. This notion is
important because analysis can prove a certain protocol correct under a set of assumptions that
might not actually hold for a specific environment. For example, BAN logic (as is explained
in 2.1.2) proved the NS protocol correct under a set of assumptions that are not valid in some
environments. An explicit notion of security objectives would have avoided this problem.
In addition, our inclusion of security objectives helps us model the set of requirements for
a specific network environment. For example, assume that an organization is to deploy the NS
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Table 3.1: Security Objectives and Threats
Threat
Security Objective(s)
Eavesdropping and Traffic Analysis
Confidentiality
Message Insertion, Modification, and Replay Confidentiality and Integrity
Masquerading
Authentication and Access Control
Man-in-the-Middle
Authentication and Access Control
Session Hijacking
Authentication, Confidentiality, and
Integrity
Denial-of-Service (DoS)
Availability, Authentication,
Confidentiality, and Integrity
protocol from a wired environment to a wireless environment. Under our model, the proof of
correctness of NS protocol in a wired network is not sufficient to guarantee the legitimate working
of the protocol in the wireless network. The organization has to define its security objectives for
the wireless environment and then verify the NS protocol with the newly added constraints. Under
our scheme, the formal verification process would appear as shown in Figure 3.1.
In future years, we expect large deployments of WLANs in different spheres of life. Many
critical domains such as defence and banks, are concerned with the security threats in WLANs.
These threats are potential violations of one or more security objectives. In Table 3.1, we map
these threats to their corresponding security objectives.

3.2 Security objectives in 802.11
Wireless networks introduce additional risks than those associated with the wired networks. In
order to mitigate these risks, organizations need to adopt security policies that reduce threats to a
manageable level. This calls for analyzing possible threats and then forming security objectives
that counter these threats. The IEEE 802.11 specification utilizes several security services in order
to carry out secure operations in WLANs. These security services are provided largely by the
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A framework for modeling
a system

A description language

A specification language

Translate the properties
that need to be verified in
the specification language

Define security objectives

Explicitly model all security
objectives using the
specification language

A verification method

Establish the correctness

Figure 3.1: The Proposed Formal Verification Model
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Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol. This section explains how the security objectives were
addressed in the 802.11 standard. It also discusses the shortcomings of WEP in order to understand
the motivation behind the IEEE 802.11i amendment and its RSN framework.

3.2.1 Authentication and Access Control
The IEEE 802.11 specification defines two authentication methods to validate the identities of
the participants attempting to gain access to a WLAN. These authentication methods are open
system authentication and shared key authentication. In open system authentication, a wireless
station is authenticated to an AP by providing its MAC address and Service Set Identifier (SSID)
for the AP. 802.11 allows MAC address filtering, which is prone to traffic analysis attack. The
adversary can easily spoof an authorized MAC address and then set its own MAC address to the
spoofed MAC address. Similar to MAC addresses, SSIDs are prone to eavesdropping because they
are broadcasted in the plaintext. Furthermore, open system authentication only allows one way
authentication where an AP authenticates a client. Hence, the wireless client is not sure whether it
is communicating with a legitimate AP or an adversary impersonating as a legitimate AP.
In contrast to open system authentication, shared key authentication is a cryptographic technique based on a simple challenge-response criteria. The shared key authentication scheme is
based on a secret cryptographic key known as the WEP key, which is shared by the legitimate participants. In order to authenticate a STA, the AP generates a 128-bit random challenge and sends
this challenge to the STA as shown in Figure 3.2. The STA encrypts the AP’s challenge using the
WEP key and returns the result to the AP. The AP decrypts the STA’s result using the same WEP
key. The AP grants access to the STA, if the decrypted value is the same as the initial challenge
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Authentication Response
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802.11 Authentication

Authentication Request
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Authentication Challenge
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AP

Authentication Success

Figure 3.2: Authentication in WEP
sent by the AP. Otherwise, the AP denies access to the STA. Both open system authentication and
shared key authentication are summarized in Figure 3.2. Similar to open system authentication,
the AP is still not authenticated to the STA in the shared key authentication.

3.2.1.1

Key Management

The IEEE 802.11 does not specify a key management technique. In shared key authentication, all
devices are configured using the same or small sets of WEP keys. This means that if an 802.11
device is lost or stolen, the cryptographic keys could become compromised and would put security
of the rest of the network devices in jeopardy. In WEP, same key is extended to provide confidentiality and integrity. Thus, a compromised WEP key jeopardizes other security objectives beyond
authentication and needs to be replaced on all wireless stations and APs. Doing so, however, is not
an easy process in the 802.11 WLANs because the new WEP key needs to be deployed manually.
In addition, the administrators need to perform the record keeping and destruction of keys on every
802.11 device in the network, which limit the scalability of the 802.11 WLANs.
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3.2.2 Confidentiality
Confidentiality in 802.11 standard is implemented through the use of a cryptographic technique
offered by WEP. The WEP technique uses RC4 stream key cipher algorithm to generate a pseudorandom data sequence, which is then applied with an exclusive-or (XOR) operation to the data
to be transmitted. The WEP specification supports a 40-bit key-size for the shared key although
many vendors use a 104-bit key as a non standard extension. A 24-bit value known as IV is used
as a seed value for initializing the cryptographic key stream. The adversary can use eavesdropping
and traffic analysis to calculate certain packet fields, if same encrypted data is used over and over
again. Figure 3.3 summarizes the encryption process of WEP.
Most attacks for confidentiality target vulnerabilities in the IV. The 24-bit IV is sent in clear
text and its relatively small size is open to eavesdropping and traffic analysis attacks. The small
size of IV combined with the static shared key is prone to traffic analysis attacks as there is a high
possibility of key stream re-usage [BGW01][Wal00]. Also, the concatenation of IV and the shared
key has weaknesses in generating the per-packet RC4 key [FMS01]. An adversary can attack
this weakness by eavesdropping on several million packets [SIR02]. The 128-bit WEP key was
publicly broken by FBI agents in about three minutes [Che05].

3.2.2.1

RC4

The working of RC4 is carried through two different algorithms: a Key Scheduling Algorithm
(KSA) and a Pseudo Random Generation Algorithm (PRGA), as shown in Figure 3.4. KSA initializes the permutation of the secret internal state with a variable (40-256 bits) length key. The
KSA loops N times and initializes the array S to be the identity permutation. The array S is then
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Figure 3.3: Encryption in WEP
processed for 256 iterations. After this initialization, PRGA is used to modify the state and generate a stream of bits. The algorithm is based on the use of a random permutation. The PRGA
initializes two indices i and j to 0 and then in each iteration, increments i, adds the value of the
array S pointed to by i to j, exchanges the values of S[i] and S[j], and outputs the value of S at the
location S[i] + S[j] (modulo 256). Each value of the array S is swapped at least once every 256
iterations.
Many problems with RC4 have been reported. The attack given in [FM00] targeted the keystream
generated by RC4, which is slightly biased in favor of certain sequences of bytes. The authors of
[MS01] used a better distinguisher that can only be used for a partial attack in broadcast applications using 228 data. RC4 does not take a separate nonce alongside the key, which can ensure that
encrypting the same message twice produces a different ciphertext each time. One way to address
this problem is to generate each RC4 key by hashing a long term key with a unique nonce using a
construction such as Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [KBC97]. The authors
57

PRGA(K)

KSA(K)

i=0
j=0

for i = 0 to N - 1
S[ i ] = i
endfor
j=0
for i = 0 to N - 1
j = j + S[ i ] + K[ i mod l ]
Swap(S[ i ], S[ j ])
endfor

While GeneratingOutput
i=i+1
j = j + S[ i ]
Swap(S[ i ], S[ j ])
Output z = S[ S[ i ] + S[ j ] ]
endwhile

Figure 3.4: RC4 Algorithm
of [FMS01] state that over all possible RC4 keys, the statistics for the first few bytes of output
keystream are strongly non-random. This non-random nature can leak information about the key.
If the long term key and nonce are simply concatenated to generate the RC4 key, this long term
key can be discovered by analyzing a large number of messages encrypted with this key. This
vulnerability can be used to break WEP.

3.2.3 Integrity
WEP provides data integrity for wireless communications between the participants of a WLAN.
The aim is to reject any message that has been modified in transit. WEP provides this integrity
service through a simple encrypted Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) scheme. A 32-bit CRC
checksum is computed on each payload prior to transmission. The resultant packet is then encrypted using the RC4 key stream and is transmitted over the wireless link. Upon the receipt of
this message, the receiver performs decryption on the received payload. The receiver then recomputes the CRC and compares it with the one computed with the original message. If the checksums
do not match, the received message is discarded.
Similar to confidentiality, the integrity scheme in 802.11 is vulnerable to certain attacks. The
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CRC is not a secure cryptographic mechanism. An adversary can find out which bits in a 32-bit
CRC will change when message bits are modified in transit. One way to protect this is to form
an Integrity Check Value (ICV) by encrypting the 32-bit CRC. But it will not serve any good
purpose as the encryption can not prevent the same bits from flipping. Furthermore, an adversary
can arbitrarily modify or forge a packet because ICV is a linear and non-cryptographic function of
the message [BGW01]. These weaknesses in integrity allows an adversary to recover the plaintext
as in IP redirection and reaction attacks [BGW01] and inductive chosen plaintext attacks [Arb01].

3.2.4 Availability
The unprotected management and control frames of 802.11 WLANs provoke many DoS vulnerabilities. In order to obtain an unfair allocation of the bandwidth, an adversary can use a smaller
and ultimately no backoff time and transmit legitimate messages without following the standard
[KV03]. The adversary can forge the Deauthentication, Disassociation, Traffic Indication Map
(TIM), or Poll messages to launch a DoS on the entire Basic Service Set (BSS) [BS03]. The
Ready To Send (RTS) frame in the virtual carrier-sense scheme can be forged with an extremely
large value of Network Allocation Vector (NAV), which will cause the participants to consider the
channel busy [BS03][CDV03]. The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache poisoning can also
be used to launch a DoS [FD01]. In addition, the speed limitation of a WLAN makes it easier for
an adversary to launch a DoS attack from the IP or upper layers by ICMP ping flooding [Neo03].

In Table 3.2, we map the problems with WEP to a set of corresponding security objectives.
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Table 3.2: WEP Problems and Security Objectives
WEP Problem
Compromised Security Objective
Open system authentication is vulnerable Authentication
SSID is vulnerable
Authentication
No mutual authentication
Authentication
Short cryptographic keys
Authentication
Non-automated key update
Key Management
Static/short IV
Confidentiality
Incorrect RC4 key scheduling
Confidentiality
Inadequate CRC-32
Integrity
Unprotected frames
Availability
ARP cache poisoning
Availability
3.3 Security Objectives in 802.11i
The IEEE 802.11i amendment addresses the security vulnerabilities in WEP through two general
classes of security capabilities for 802.11 WLANs. The first class, pre-RSN security, includes
the legacy security capabilities developed in the original IEEE 802.11 specification. The pre-RSN
security addresses authentication through open system or shared key authentication, and confidentiality and integrity through WEP. The second class defines RSN that includes security enhancements to address all known weaknesses of WEP. In this section, we describe how 802.11i addresses
security objectives in WLANs.

3.3.1 Authentication
The 802.1i amendment uses the IEEE 802.1X standard [IEE04b] to provide mutual authentication between a STA and an AS. The 802.1X uses the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
[BV98][ABV04]. EAP provides a framework that allows the use of multiple methods for achieving authentication including static passwords, dynamic passwords, and public key cryptography
certificates. We briefly explain EAP and 802.1X in the following sections.
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Figure 3.5: EAP Message Format
3.3.1.1

Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)

EAP [ABV04] is an authentication framework that is frequently used in the wireless networks
and in the Point-to-Point connections. EAP provides a wide variety of authentication mechanisms
known as EAP methods. The EAP messages have a similar basic format consisting of four fields:
Code, Identifier, Length, and Data, as shown in Figure 3.5. The code field is one byte and can
have values equal to Request, Response, Success, or Failure. The Identifier field is one byte and
is provided to match Responses with their corresponding Requests. The Length field is two bytes
and indicates the total number of bytes in the EAP message including the Code, Identifier, Length,
and Data fields. The Data field is zero or more bytes and contains the actual data.
In addition to special types, EAP defines three basic authentication types as Message-Digest-5
Challenge (MD5-Challenge), One-Time Password (OTP), and Generic Token Card (GTC). The
EAP specification requires that all EAP implementations support three special types and MD5Challenge method. The support for the other two basic authentication types (i.e, OTP and GTC)
is optional. The extensible nature of EAP has allowed the development of many EAP methods.
Some well known methods are EAP-MD5, EAP-OTP, EAP-GTC, EAP-TLS, EAP-IKEv2, EAPSIM, and EAP-AKA. In addition, a number of vendor specific methods and new proposals exist.
Commonly used modern methods capable of operating in wireless networks include: EAP-TLS,
EAP-SIM, EAP-AKA, PEAP, and EAP-TTLS. Requirements for EAP methods used in the wireless LAN authentication are described in [SWA05].
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3.3.1.2

802.1X

802.1X [IEE04b] is an IEEE standard for port-based network access control. The 802.1X standard
addresses the security of WLANs by providing an authentication framework that allows a user to
be authenticated by a central authority. The authentication of 802.1X has three main participants
known as supplicant (also known as client or peer or STA), authenticator (or AP), and AS as shown
in Figure 3.6. The protocol used between the supplicant and the AP is typically EAP over LAN
(EAPOL) and between the AP and the AS is RADIUS. This is further elaborated in Figure 3.6.

3.3.2 Key Management
In this section, we discuss key management or Key Generation and Distribution (KGD) in 802.11i.
The pre-RSN 802.11 WLANs relied on WEP and did not provide any KGD mechanism. On
the other hand, the IEEE 802.11i EAPOL-key exchange uses a number of keys and has two key
hierarchies to divide initial key material into useful keys. The two key hierarchies are Pairwise
Key Hierarchy and Group Key Hierarchy. The Pairwise Key Hierarchy addresses unicast, whereas
the Group key Hierarchy targets multicast or broadcast traffic protection.
In the Pairwise Key Hierarchy, two root keys are used to generate additional keys required for
various confidentiality and integrity protections. These root keys are Pre-Shared Key (PSK) and
Authentication Authorization and Accounting Key (AAAK). A PSK is a static secret, which is
shared between the STA and the AS using some secure channel before it needs to be used. A PMK
is formed using one of the root keys. The PMK is used for the derivation of the Pairwise Transient
Key (PTK) along with the MAC addresses and nonces of the STA and the AP. A Pseudo-Random
Function (PRF) is used to generate the PTK from the PMK.
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Figure 3.6: Authentication Using 802.1X
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Name
WEP Key
AAA Key
MIC Key
EAPOL-KCK
EAPOL-KEK
TK

PSK
PMK
GMK
PTK

GTK

Table 3.3: Summary of Keys
Size (bits)
Purpose
40-104
Used with WEP.
≥ 256
Used to derive PMK. Used with 802.1X
authentication and key management.
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TKIP’s Michael MIC uses it to provide
integrity protection.
128
Used for integrity protection of the key
material.
128
Used for confidentiality of the key material.
256 (TKIP),
Used with TKIP or CCMP to provide
128 (CCMP)
confidentiality and integrity protection
for unicast traffic.
256
Forms PMK.
256
Used to derive the PTK.
128
Used to derive the GTK.
512 (TKIP),
Consists of EAPOL-KCK, EAPOL-KEK,
384 (CCMP)
and TK and provides confidentiality and
integrity protection.
40-104 (WEP), Used to provide confidentiality and
256 (TKIP),
integrity protection for multicast or
128 (CCMP)
broadcast traffic.

The Group Key Hierarchy consists of a Group Master Key (GMK) and a Group Temporal Key
(GTK). The GMK is a random number. The GTK is derived by running a pseudorandom function
over the GMK and some other parameters. The GTK is encrypted using the EAPOL-KEK assigned
to the STA and protects the data from being tampered using a Message Integrity Code (MIC). The
GTK may need to be updated when a session expires or when a device leaves a network. We
provide a summary of keys and their usage in Table 1.

3.3.3 Confidentiality and Integrity
The IEEE 802.11i amendment addresses confidentiality and integrity through two protocols: Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP), and Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining MAC Proto64

Table 3.4:
Security Feature
Cryptographic algorithm
Authentication
Key management
Integrity provision
Replay protection

Confidentiality and Integrity Comparison
WEP
TKIP
CCMP
RC4
RC4
AES
Open system PSK or
PSK or
or Shared key EAP with 802.1X EAP with 802.1X
Manual
Manual or 802.1X Manual or 802.1X
CRC-32
Michael MIC
CCM
None
IV
IV

col (CCMP). In order to claim RSNA compliance, support for CCMP is mandatory. Support for
TKIP, on the other hand, is optional. In Table 2, we present a comparison between the confidentiality and integrity approaches of pre-RSN and RSN frameworks. TKIP and CCMP are described
further in the following sections.

3.3.3.1

Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)

TKIP is a cipher suite that is employed to address the security concerns in WEP. The motivation
behind the usage of TKIP is to enhance the security of WEP protocol. TKIP does not require
computationally advanced encryption because it was designed to work on pre-RSN hardware. In
a WLAN, TKIP addresses confidentiality through RC4 and integrity protection using the Michael
message digest algorithm. In addition, TKIP employs a frame sequencing technique to prevent
replay attacks. The attack of [FMS01] is countered by using a new encryption key for each frame.
WEP simply concatenated its key with the IV to form a traffic key that can be attacked by an
adversary. TKIP addresses this weakness by hashing the initialization vector (IV) values.
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3.3.3.2

Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining MAC Protocol (CCMP)

802.11i uses CCMP to address confidentiality and integrity in RSNs [WHF03]. CCMP uses the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm [Nat01] for data protection. The encapsulation of
a plaintext MAC Protocol Data Unit (MPDU) is carried out in several steps. The PN (maintained
for the session) is incremented to obtain a fresh PN for each MPDU. The PN and other portions
of the address field are then combined to form a nonce. A CCMP header is formed by combining
identifier for the TK or KeyID, and the PN. The fields in the MAC header are used to construct the
Additional Authentication Data (AAD). The nonce, AAD, and plaintext are passed to CCM along
with the TK in order to encrypt the data. Concatenations is performed on the CCM and packet
headers and the ciphertext data to form the ciphertext.
On the receiving side, decapsulation is performed. The receiver parse the encrypted frame to
reconstruct the AAD and the nonce. The reconstructed AAD and nonce along with the TK, MIC,
and encrypted payload are used by the CCM to retrieve the plaintext. CCM also verifies the MIC
integrity checking to ensure that the message is not modified in transit. Concatenation is then
performed on the received plaintext and the frame header to form the plaintext frame. In order to
provide replay protection, the PN in the frame is compared with the PN maintained for the session.
The frame is discarded if the received PN is not greater than the session PN. The CCMP encryption
and decryption are summarized in Figure 3.7.

3.3.4 Availability
Many DoS vulnerabilities in 802.11i exist despite the use of strong authentication and access control, confidentiality, and integrity protocols. During KGD, an adversary is able to launch a memory
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Figure 3.7: CCMP Encryption and Decryption
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DoS attack by sending out numerous forged messages. The authors of [HM04] counters this attack
by simply reusing the nonces in the supplicant. This approach inherently eliminates the vulnerability but may consume more computation power in the supplicant. The management frames and
control frames can be forged to launch a DoS attack. The unprotected EAP messages in 802.1X
authentication can be exploited by an adversary to prevent the 802.1X authentication from succeeding. In addition, the AP can be flooded by forged Association Request frames sent by an
adversary. In order to address these vulnerabilities, the authors of [HM05] propose some modifications in 802.11i. They also use the idea of swapping authentication and association of [FC02].

3.4 Summary
The security objectives enforce the security policy that defines what is to be protected in a WLAN.
This section explains WLAN security with a focus on its security objectives. We define authentication and access control, confidentiality, integrity, and availability as common security objectives of
a WLAN. We also describe the security attacks that are induced in a WLAN when one or more of
these security objectives are compromised. The IEEE 802.11 standard uses WEP to achieve security objectives in WLANs. Many vulnerabilities were discovered in WEP which led the designers
to replace it with new security mechanisms defined in the IEEE 802.11i amendment. We explain
how security objectives were addressed in the 802.11 standard and discuss the shortcomings of
WEP in order to understand the motivation behind 802.11i and its RSN framework.
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CHAPTER 4
DEVELOPING FORMAL MODELS FOR SECURITY PROTOCOLS

In this chapter, we develop the modal logic and the proof based models for the security protocol
verification using the Strand Space framework. In our modal logic approach, we present the logical
constructs to model a protocol’s behavior in such a way that the participants can verify different
security parameters by looking at their own run of the protocol. Our model captures the notion
of matching parameters and provides formal proofs for the security protocol verification. We also
present a proof based model that contains a generic set of proofs to establish the correctness of a
security protocol.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we present a Modal logic approach that
simplifies the protocol analysis by avoiding the different ways a penetrator can attack a protocol.
We explain a formal model for the security objectives of 802.11i in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we
present a mathematical model that provides basis for the correctness proofs of 802.11i in the form
of various lemmas.

4.1 A Modal Logic Approach Based on SSM
In this section, we lay out a model for analyzing the security protocols. Our model has a modal
logic approach that is based on SSM. The presented model aims to establish a state where one principal furnishes assurance that its set of parameters matches with that of its counterpart [MFG06d,
MFG06b]. We provide guarantees about certain aspects of a protocol that include, but are not limited to, data freshness, identity of the principals, message origination, etc. SSM incorporates the
guaranteeing mechanism in [FHG99]. Our work is unique because unlike SSM, we do not need
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to explicitly model the penetrator [MFG06c, MFG06a]. However, we do utilize some notions presented in SSM to facilitate the understanding of our proof mechanism [MFGa, MGF04a, MFGb,
MGF04b].
Our approach uses simple logical formulas to represent the security primitives. The crux of
the matter rests in the trust that a participant can establish by looking at its own run of the protocol. Security protocols can be thought of as consisting of a set of basic operations, which can
be applied to achieve desired goals. We first define these operations in terms of predicates. We
group the predicates such that they represent the basic building blocks of a security protocol. For
instance, we group together predicates that represent communication (sending or receiving a message). Similarly, notion of subterm (ingredient of a message), freshness (used in nonce and the idea
based on freshness like origination and unique origination), and cryptographic algebra (encrypting
or decrypting any message) are categorized into their respective groups. Then, we formulate the
inference rules that help us achieve the desired goals of security protocols. The inference rules are
also categorized in order to define notions like subterm and to describe security protocol primitives
like cryptography, message structure, etc.
We begin by laying out the framework for analyzing the authentication property of the security
protocols. The underlying logical structure of our framework is based on the predicate logic.
We define the syntax and semantics of our language for the security protocol verification in the
following sections.
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4.1.1

Syntax of the Language

We begin by laying out the framework for analyzing the authentication property of the security
protocols. The meta-symbols P and Q are used to denote participants, the letter K is used to
represent the encryption keys (K −1 for the corresponding decryption key), and the letters M, M 0 ,
N and N 0 are used to represent messages of the language. We use {M}K to represent an encrypted
message and {M}−1
K to represent a signed message. Moreover, Hash(M) represents a one-way
computationally feasible function of M. We define the following operations on messages:
• subterm: Subterm defines what can be analyzed from a message or a set of messages. Assuming that all the participants are capable of separating a concatenated message and decrypting a message with the known keys, we define subterm as follows. Every term is a
subterm of itself, that is, M ∈ subterm(M). Concatenates are the subterms of the concatenated term, that is, M, N ∈ subterm(MN). Contents of an encrypted term are the subterm of
the message, that is, M ∈ subterm({M}K ). Contents of a signed term are the subterm of the
message, that is, M ∈ subterm({M}−1
K ). Subterm of a set of terms is simply the union of the
subterms of each of its terms.
• superterm: Since a participant can concatenate two messages and encrypt a message with the
known key, superterm gives the idea of what can be synthesized from a message or a set of
messages. Every term is a superterm of itself, M ∈ superterm(M). Every concatenated term
is the superterms of its concatenates, that is, M, MN, N M ∈ superterm(M). An encrypted
term is the superterm of its contents, that is, {M}K ∈ superterm(M). A signed term is the
superterm of its contents, that is, {M}−1
K ∈ superterm(M). Superterm of a set of terms is
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simply the union of the superterms of each of its terms. The notion of superterm can be
applied recursively to find more superterms.
• Key(P): It returns the secret key of a participant P.
• Ss(N,M): This relation holds between two terms N and M such that it yields true if N ∈
subterm(M), and f alse otherwise.
• Se(N,M): This relation holds between two messages N and M such that it yields true if
N = M, and f alse otherwise. If M, M 0 , N, N 0 represent messages and K and K 0 are keys,
then the equivalence of two messages implies:
1. {M}K = {M 0 }K 0 ⇒ M = M 0 ∧ K = K 0
2. MN = M 0 N 0 ⇒ M = M 0 ∧ N = N 0
• Encrypt(N, K): This relation holds between two terms N, and K, and it returns M such that
M = {N}K .
• S ign(N, K −1 ): This relation holds between two terms N, and K −1 , such that it returns {N}−1
K .

4.1.2 Propositional Constructs
The language of formula used in the cryptographic protocol world are based on the following
constructs:
Cr: The set of messages received by a participant.
Cs: The set of messages sent by a participant.
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Fr: The set of messages that are considered fresh.
Fo: It represents the message that originates in a participant’s trace. A message may be received
at a destination after being forwarded by several participants, but our analysis focuses on the
originator of the message.
Fu: It represents a message that uniquely originates in a protocol run. That is, the term has been
originated by only one participant in the entire run of the protocol.
H f : This is the message that occurs first in the trace of the current authentication of a participant.
Hs: The relation that holds between two terms such that the second term is sent into the first term.
H p: It represents the occurrence of all the messages that precede a message in the state of a
participant.
Hx: The relation that holds within three terms such that the first term does not exist in any message
that precedes the second message.
Er: The relation that holds for terms P, Q, N, and M, such that only participant P can reply a
challenge generated by Q by extracting the secret N from M.
Hm: The relation that holds within four terms P,M, N, and N 0 , such that a message M is received
in which N is a subterm and N 0 is not a subterm.
Eo: The relation that holds within three terms P, M and Q such that the participant P successfully
answers the challenge M generated by the participant Q.
S ec: It holds if a secret generated by a participant remains secret in the protocol.
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4.1.3 Model of Computation
In order to provide rigorous semantics of the proposed logic, we lay out the model of computation
for the system. A protocol is executed by a finite set of participants, P1 , . . . , Pn . The participants
communicate by sending messages to each other. Each participant Pi has a local state given at time
t as si (t). A run r is an execution of the protocol and can be represented as an infinite sequence
of global states at integral times. For a fixed run r of the protocol, the global state at time t is
defined as an n-tuple of the local states of all the participants at t. That is, gr (t) = (s1 (t), . . . , sn (t)).
Individual participants perform actions such that each action produces a transition from one state
to the next. These actions include external actions only, such as send(message, recipientList),
receive(message), and generate(atomicT erms). Internal actions (such as internal computations,
encryption, etcetera), on the other hand, do not contribute towards a transition in a state. A trace
tri is the local view of an execution of the protocol by participant Pi . It can be represented as an
infinite sequence of local states si at integral times. Alternatively, a run can be given as an n-tuple
of the traces of all the participants of a protocol, that is, r = (tr1 , . . . , trn ). The first state of a run r
is assigned some time tr ≤ 0 and the initial state of the current authentication is at t = 0.
Each participant maintains T ot , a set of all atomic terms, and Xt , a set of received messages up
to time t, in its local state si (t). T ot = T t ∪ Kt , where T t is the set of atomic terms such as participant
names (ids) and generated secrets (nonces) up to time t, and Kt is the set of keys that Pi possesses up
to t. If {M}k ∈ Xt and k−1 ∈ Kt , then M ∈ Xt . Similarly, if MN ∈ Xt then M, N ∈ Xt . The local state
maintains a counter, messageCount, for the protocol messages in the current authentication. This
counter increments only when a message is sent or is received by a participant in a protocol run.
The local state also contains a local history of all the actions the participant has performed, along
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with a set of computations (encryption and decryption with available keys, hashes, signatures)
available to Pi .

4.1.4

Semantics

Here we describe the semantics of the constructs of the proposed logic. Let Φ be the set of atomic
propositions. Fix a system R and an interpretation π that maps each proposition p ∈ Φ to the set
of global states π(p) in R at which p is true. Truth of a formula ϕ in global state gr (t), written
gr (t) |= ϕ, is inductively defined below.
gr (t) |= p iff gr (t) ∈ π(p) for p ∈ Φ,
gr (t) |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff gr (t) |= ϕ and gr (t) |= ψ, and
gr (t) |= ¬ϕ iff it is not the case that gr (t) |= ϕ.
Now semantics for the remaining constructs is as follows.
Received Message: gr (t) |= Cr(P, M) iff for message M at time t in r, receive(M) appears in P’s
local history. In other words, receive(M) appears in the trace of the participant P, trP at t. It also
results in an increment of messageCount in sP (t).
Sent Message: gr (t) |= Cs(P, M) iff for message M at time 0 ≤ t0 ≤ t in r, P performs
send(M, recipientList) and M ∈ {superterm(Xt0 ∪ T ot0 )}. Moreover, sP (t) increments its local
counter messagCount by one.
Fresh Message: It is necessary as well as sufficient for freshness that the message has never been
sent before the initial state of the current authentication of the protocol. Therefore, if M 0 (r, t)
represents the set of all messages sent by any participant in time t in r, gr (t) |= Fr(M) iff, for all
participants at t0 < 0, M < subterm(M 0 (r, t0 )).
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Term Origination: Term origination means that a message is sent by a participant such that it
contains a term, which appears first in the trace of its current authentication. gr (t) |= Fo(M, P)
iff for message M at time t in r, P performs send(superterm(M), recipientList) and for tr p at
0 ≤ t0 < t, M < subterm(M 0 (tr p , t0 ) ∪ Xt0 ), where M 0 (tr p , t0 ) represents the set of all messages sent
in the trace tr p in t0 .
Unique Origination: A message M uniquely originates by a participant P in gr (t) if no one else
originates M in r. gr (t) |= Fu(M, P) iff gr (t) |= Fo(M, P) and it is not the case that gr (t0 ) |=
Fo(M, Q), where t0 ≥ 0 and Q , P.
First Messages: A message is termed first message in the trace of a participant if it lies first in its
trace of the current authentication. If M0 ∈ {M 0 (tr p , t) ∪ Xt } represents the message sent or received
by the participant P in the trace tr p at time t = 0, then gr (t) |= H f (M, P) iff M = M0 .
Sending a Subterm: gr (t) |= Hs(M, N) iff gr (t) |= Cs(P, M) and N = subterm(M).
Preceding Messages: A set of messages precede a message M if they occur (sent or received)
before M occurs in the current authentication of a particular trace. gr (t) |= H p(N, M) iff N =
{M 0 (tr p , t0 ) ∪ Xt0 }, 0 ≤ t0 < t, and M is the message sent or received in tr p at t.
Non-existence in the Preceding Messages: A message is termed non-existent in the preceding
messages if it does not occur in any of those messages in the trace of a participant. gr (t) |=
Hx(N, M, P) iff N < subterm(M 0 (tr p , t0 ) ∪ Xt0 ), N ∈ subterm(M), and 0 ≤ t0 < t, where M 0 (tr p , t0 )
represents the set of messages sent in the trace tr p in time t0 and M is the message sent or received
in tr p at t.
Challenge Reply: Only the participant who can extract the secret challenge message can reply the
challenge. gr (t) |= Er(P, Q, N, M) iff gr (t) |= Fu(N, Q), gr (t) |= Fr(N), and M is an encrypted
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message of the form {M 0 }K such that N ∈ subterm(M 0 ), K −1 ∈ Kt of P (and Q in symmetric
cryptography) and K −1 < Kt of any other participant.
Receiving Specific Sub-messages: A participant receives a messages in which it expects certain
sub-messages. gr (t) |= Hm(P, M, N, N 0 ) iff receive(M) appears in P’s local history such that N ∈
subterm(M) and N 0 < subterm(M).
Assurance in a Received Message: A participant gains assurance that its challenge has been successfully answered by the desired participant. gr (t) |= Eo(P, M, Q) iff gr (t0 ) |= Er(P, Q, N, M),
gr (t) |= Hm(Q, N 0 , N, M), P , Q, and t0 < t. That is, the participant Q has uniquely originated
a fresh secret N in a message M such that only P can extract the secret from the message, and Q
has received a reply in which N is present then Q gets convinced that the participant P must have
received its message M and decrypted it. Notice here that the message Q receives (N 0 ) must not
contain M as a subterm, otherwise any participant could simply forward Q’s challenge back to him
without even letting P know about the communication at all.
Secrecy: A uniquely originated secret within an encrypted message of a protocol maintains its
secrecy if the secret is never sent out in any form other than that of the encrypted message of
the protocol. Notice that this definition is sufficient but not necessary for secrecy. A superterm
of the protocol message containing encrypted secret also maintains its secrecy. Hence, we posit
that gr (t) |= S ec(P, M) iff M uniquely originates in an encrypted message M 0 with the decryption keys available to only intended recipients and at time t0 ≥ t in r, no participant Q performs
send(M 00 , recipientList) such that M ∈ {subterm(M 00 )\M 0 }. Here, A\B means the set difference of
A and B.
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4.1.5 The Proposed Logic
The proposed theory captures the entire notion about how we prove a cryptographic protocol correct. The security protocol is defined in terms of generic building blocks. The proposed postulates
then establish the properties that each building block should possess in order to provide some
guarantees. These properties are essential in establishing the confidence in the working of security
protocols. We use modus ponens as the inference rule in our logic. That is,

ϕ ∧ (ϕ → ψ) ` ψ

The following rules possess descriptive nature about information contained in a message. These
postulates tell us about sending any message that contains some nonce as a subterm [P1 ], nonexistence of a subterm inside all the messages preceding a message [P2 ], and a message having specific
terms as its subterms [P3 ]. Notice that the postulate [P2 ] contains the idea of term origination of a
participant’s current authentication. If the term lies on the first node in the trace of current authentication, then that node may serve as the originating node for that term. Whereas, if it is not the
first node, one needs to check all the preceding nodes in order to find out if they contain that term.
[P1 ] S s(N, M) ∧ Cs(P, M) → Hs(M, N)
[P2 ] ¬H f (M, P) ∧ @M 0 ∈ N 0 ((H p(N 0 , M) ∧ (S s(N, M 0 ))) → Hx(N, M, P)
[P3 ] Cr(P, M) ∧ S s(N, M) ∧ ¬S s(N 0 , M) → Hm(P, M, N, N 0 )
The following axioms describe the notion of origination and unique origination of a message. Our
notion of origination captures simple information about the first sender of a message. [P4 ] states
that a term sent in the first message of a trace originates in that message. [P5 ] implies that a node
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serves as the originating node for a term if the term is sent in the message such that it has not been
sent in any message preceding that node.
[P4 ] H f (M, P) ∧ Hs(M, N) → Fo(N, P)
[P5 ] ¬H f (M, P) ∧ Hs(M, N) ∧ Hx(N, M, P) → Fo(N, P)
A received signed message originates from where it is signed.
[P6 ] Cr(P, M) ∧ S e(M, S ign(M 0 , K −1 )) ∧ S e(Key(Q), K −1 ) → Fo(M, Q)
If a message uniquely originates in a protocol run, then it uniquely originates at its originating trace
[P7 ]. If Part represents the set of all participants playing in a protocol, then ∀Q ∈ Part, Q , P:
[P7 ] Fo(N, P) ∧ ¬Fo(N, Q) → Fu(N, P)
A message is fresh if its ingredients contain a fresh term.
[P8 (a)] Fr(M) → Fr(superterm(M))
[P8 (b)] Fr(M) → Fr(Hash(M))
The following are the concluding rules that contain guarantees within them about messages reaching at a destination.
[P9 ],
Fu(N, Q) ∧ Fr(N) ∧ S s(N, N 0 ) ∧ S e(M, Encrypt(N 0 , K)) ∧ S e(Key(P), K −1 ) → Er(P, Q, N, M)
Finally,
[P10 ] Er(P, Q, N, M) ∧ Hm(Q, N 0 , N, M) → Eo(P, M, Q)
That is, if a fresh message is originated such that only the participant P is able to decipher it and obtain the secret N, then only P can successfully answer the challenge, [P9 ]. [P10 ] implies if only the
participant P is able to answer some challenge and the desired answer of the challenge is received
in a protocol then P must have received and opened the challenge. Notice here that the guarantees
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we provide are somewhat strict in the sense that even after getting the desired response from a
participant, the receiver does not provide guarantee about the sender of the response. However,
receiver does guarantee that the intended participant has received and decrypted the challenge.
A protocol typically contains some secret parameter in its one or more messages that is used either
to help achieve proper authentication, or simply to distribute the secret to other participants. The
secret must be the subterm of an encrypted message such that only the legitimate participants hold
the proper decryption key in order to open the message and extract that secret from it. The protocol
must guarantee that its secret never appears in any message other than those purposely encrypted
messages that contain the secret. Provided the keys with which the messages containing the secret
are encrypted do not get compromised, one needs to check if the secret appears in any form other
than that of the encrypted secret messages. That is, if M 0 is the set of messages of the protocol in
which secret N occurs, K 0 is the set of secret keys known to only legitimate participants, and M 00
is the set of messages sent by any participant such that M 0 ∩ M 00 = ∅. Then in order to preserve
secrecy of N generated by participant P, ∀m ∈ M 00 , M ∈ M 0 , K ∈ K 0
[P11 ] Fu(N, P) ∧ S s(N, N 0 ) ∧ S e(M, Encrypt(N 0 , K)) ∧ ¬Cs(Q, m) → S ec(P, N)
such that N ∈ {subterm(m)\M}. Notice that the messages of the form superterm(M) (for example, {MX}k , MX) may occur in M 00 but as long as N < subterm(X), the secrecy of N never gets
compromised.

4.1.6 Soundness
We prove that our logical schema is sound with respect to the given semantics and the model of
computation. We show that our set of formulas are valid and the rules to derive new axioms from
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the valid axioms preserves the truth. If Γ represents a set of formulae and ϕ is a formula, then
soundness implies that if Γ ` ϕ then Γ |= ϕ. That is, if ϕ can be derived from Γ then ϕ satisfies Γ
(whenever all of Γ is true, ϕ is true as well). The only rule that we use to derive ϕ is modus ponens.
There are two cases:
1) Γ ` ϕ such that ϕ is a theorem or ϕ ∈ Γ. In this case Γ |= ϕ is trivially true.
2) If modus ponens is used to derive ϕ then by induction on the structure of the derivation and
definition of truth conditions, Γ |= ϕ.
Now we show that our set of formulas are valid. We take an example postulate P5 and sketch
the proof of its validity in the following.

¬H f (M, P) ∧ Hs(M, N) ∧ Hx(N, M, P) → Fo(N, P)

This conditional is true in a state gr (t) if either the premises are false, that is, gr (t) 2 (¬H f (M, P) ∧
Hs(M, N) ∧ Hx(N, M, P)), or the conclusion is true, gr (t) |= Fo(N, P). Therefore, we only need to
check Fo(N, P) at gr (t) if gr (t) |= ¬H f (M, P) ∧ Hs(M, N) ∧ Hx(N, M, P). In this case, since the
antecedent is true at gr (t), all of its conjuncts must be true in that state. So gr (t) |= ¬H f (M, P) implies that there exists a message Mt0 ∈ {M 0 (tr p , t0 ) ∪ Xt0 } such that 0 ≤ t0 < t. Here M 0 (tr p , t0 ) ∪ Xt0
represents the set of messages sent or received by the participant P in the trace tr p in time t0 .
Now gr (t) |= Hs(M, N) ∧ Hx(N, M, P) implies N ∈ subterm(M) and a participant P performs
send(M, recipientList) operation such that N < subterm(M 0 (tr p , t0 ) ∪ Xt0 ), which leads us to conclude that gr (t) |= Fo(N, P). Hence, axiom P5 is true at all states gr (t).
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4.2

Formal Model of Security Objectives for 802.11i

We develop a formal model of security objectives for 802.11i in the following lines. Our formal
model is built using the SSM [FHG99].
We consider a set A, which contains all possible exchanged messages in 802.11i. We also use
the word subterm with members of A. We represent the transmission of a term a0 with a positive
sign as +a0 , whereas the reception of a term a0 is represented as −a0 . In this way, a signed term is
defined as a pair hσ, ai. Here, σ ∈ {+, −} and a ∈ M, where M is a set of all possible messages of
the 802.11i protocol.
In the context of 802.11i, the set of finite sequence of signed terms is represented as (±M)∗ . A
strand space over M consists of a set Σ, whose elements are called strands, together with a trace
mapping tr : Σ → (±M)∗ . The trace mapping tr associates each strand in Σ with a sequence of
signed terms.
For 802.11i, the nodes consists of client (or station or peer) nodes, access point nodes, RADIUS
server nodes, and penetrator nodes. Formally, a node is a pair hs, ii with s ∈ Σ, and i is an integer
with 1 ≤ i ≤ |tr(s)|. The set of all the nodes is donated by N. For a node n = hs, ii, where
tr(s) = hσ1 , u1 i...hσk , uk i, term(n) is defined as hσi , ui i.
There is an edge n1 →n2 if and only if term(n1 ) = +a and term(n2 ) = −a for some a ∈ M.
The edge → represents a potential causal link between two strands. When n1 = hs, ii and n2 =
hs, i + 1i are nodes, then there is an edge n1 ⇒n2 . The edge ⇒ indicates that n1 is an immediate
causal predecessor of n2 . In a similar fashion, n0 ⇒+ n implies that n0 precedes n (not necessarily
immediately) on the same strand. A term t occurs in n ∈ N if and only if t @ term(n).
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The node n ∈ N is an entry point for the term t if term(n) = +t and whenever n0 ⇒+ n,
term(n0 ) < term(n). A term t originates on n ∈ N if and only if n is an entry point for t. A term
t uniquely originates if and only if t originates on a unique n ∈ N. It can be seen that N, together
with both sets of edges n1 → n2 and n1 ⇒n2 , is a directed graph hN, (→

S

⇒i.

A bundle represents a full protocol exchange. It consists of a number of strands hooked together
where one strand sends a message and another strand receives the same message. Intuitively, a
bundle is a portion of a strand space large enough to represent at least a full protocol exchange.
Bundle has a natural causal precedence relation relative to which inductive arguments are carried
out. A bundle is a finite acyclic subgraph that captures the natural causal precedence relation
among nodes as defined by the edges → and ⇒. For a given strand space Σ, let B = hNB , (→B
S

⇒B i be a subgraph of hN, (→

S

⇒i. The graph B is a bundle if:

1. B is finite,
2. if n2 ∈ NB and term(n2 ) is negative, then there is a unique n1 such that n1 →B n2 ,
3. if n2 ∈ NB and n1 ⇒ n2 , then n1 ⇒B n2 ,
4. B is acyclic.
We use the bundle-height to establish guarantees about the client and the access point. The bundleheight of a strand is the largest i such that hs, ii ∈ bundle.
The set T ⊆ M is the set of texts (representing the atomic messages). The set K ⊆ M contains
cryptographic keys disjoint from T . The term {g}k ∈ M represents the encryption of the term g ∈ T
using k ∈ K. The subterm relation @ is inductively defines as the smallest relation such that:
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1. any term m ∈ M is a subterm of itself,
2. a term m ∈ M is a subterm of {g}k , if m is a subterm of g,
3. a term m ∈ M is a subterm of gh, if m is a subterm of g or h.
The authentication is represented in this framework as:
∀C∀s∃s0 .C − height(s) = i ∧ φ(s) =⇒ C − height(s0 ) = j ∧ ψ(s, s0 )
In the above formula, φ(s) says the type of strand of s. For example, s can be an initiator strand
or a responder strand. The statement ψ(s, s0 ) tells about the type of strand s0 and the data values
that must be shared between s and s0 .
Similarly, secrecy can be written as:
∀C∀s∀n.φ(s) ∧ n ∈ C =⇒ term(n) < IK [S ]
Secrecy establishes that none of the values in S can be disclosed.

4.3 Building Lemmas
In this section, we present lemmas of SSM that will help us in our proof process.
Lemma 1: If C is a bundle then every non-empty subset of the nodes in C has C minimal
members.
Proof: C is regarded as expressing causal precedence. In terms of SSM, this can be represented as n S n0 holds only when n’s occurrence contributes to the occurrence of n0 . The existence
of minimal members in non-empty sets serves as an induction principle that is related to the one
laid out by [Pau98, Sch97]. Intuitively, the arguments about C minimal elements are focussed not
only on the participant’s knowledge but the participant’s temporal knowledge also.
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Lemma 2: If C is a bundle and S ⊆ C is a set of nodes such that: ∀m, m0 if the unsigned term
of m is equal to the unsigned term of m0 , then this implies that m ∈ S iff m0 ∈ S .
Proof: This Lemma says that if n is a C minimal member of S , then the sign of n is positive.
If the term of n was negative, then the bundle property will cause n0 → n for some n0 ∈ C and
the unsigned term of n will be equal to the unsigned term of n0 . This makes n0 ∈ S violating the
minimal property of n.
Lemma 3: If C is a bundle, a ∈ A, and n ∈ C is a C minimal element of {m ∈ C : a @ term(m)},
then the node n is an originating occurrence for a.
Proof: Since n is a member, a @ term(n). Lemma 2 says that the sign of n is positive. If
n0 ⇒+ n, then by applying the bundle properties we will have n0 ∈ C. Hence from the minimality
property of n, a a term(n0 ). This implies that n is originating for a.
Lemma 4: A nonce t0 originates at a node n0 .
Proof: This is a generic lemma that will be frequently used to build guarantees about a specific
term. In this proof, we will provide conditions that will guarantee this lemma to hold true. Let
us call the term of n0 to be v0 . First, we notice the sign of n0 . If this is positive, we can proceed.
Otherwise, the term t0 can not be originating because a negative v0 represents the reception of a
term.
Next, we check that t0 a of n0 , where n0 is a node n x that preceded n0 on the same strand. if
term(n0 ) is equal to v1 , then we need to check that t0 , t1 . Here, t1 is a nonce and t1 ∈ v1 . The
guarantee that t0 , t2 , where t2 ∈ v1 and t2 = v1 − t1 , is established on the basis that set of nonces is
unique and the algebra is freely generated. The contents of a received matches are added into the
parameter list and this matching parameters can guarantee the truth about t0 , t1 .
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Lemma 5: The set S = {n ∈ C : t0 @ term(n) ∧ v0 a term(n)} has a  minimal node n0 . The
node n0 has a positive sign and does not originate on a penetrator strand.
Proof: We use this lemma in our proofs to guarantee that a term is not originated on a penetrator
strand. In this proof, we provide all possible cases where the term t0 can be originated on the
penetrator strand and establish the truth about this term.
In order to prove the sign of the term t0 , we consider a node that lies on the receiver side say
n1 . If this node n1 contains t0 but not v0 , then S is not empty. This implies that S has at least one
 minimal element n0 by Lemma 1. Lemma 2 says that sign of n0 is positive.
Now, the question remains whether n0 lie on the penetrator strand say p. In the following lines,
we present all possible penetrator strands to analyze this case.

M. The trace of such a penetrator strand has the form h+ti where t ∈ set of terms. In our case,
it corresponds to checking whether the subject term originates on this type of strand or not. This
can be proven by the help of Lemma 4, which states that this term uniquely originates on the regular node n0 .

F. This penetrator strand has the form h−gi. A node with a positive sign does not originate on
this strand and can be safely assumed not to be a victim of this strand.

T. This strand has the form h−g, +g, +gi. Similar to the previous strand, this strand is receiving a term initially. Any node with a positive sign does not originate on this type of strand.
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C. The C strand is represented as h−g, −h, +ghi. Again, the first node is negative. Any positively occurrence node can not lie on this strand.

K. The trace of this strand is represented as h+K0 i. Here, K0 ∈ KP where KP is a set of keys
possessed by the penetrator. A term t0 can not be equal to a term K0 unless the term t0 ∈ K where
K is a set of all possible keys. The algebra freeness assumption guarantees and prevents any nonce
to be accidentally or deliberately equal to a cryptographic key.

E. This strand has a trace of the form h−K0 , −h, +{h}K0 i. If the subject term t0 @ {h}K0 ∧ v0 a {h}K0 .
The term t0 , {h}K0 implies t0 @ h. Also, v0 a h that guarantees that the positive node is not
minimal in S .

D. This trace has the form h−K0−1 , −{h}K0 , +hi. If the positive node is minimal in S , then v0 a h.
But v0 @ {h}K0 . We can use the free encryption assumption here that says that if h = t0 t1 t2 and
K0 = K participant(A) , then there exists a node n, which is the first on this strand and have a term
−1
−1
−1
K participant(A)
. The assumptions about the key state guarantee that K participant(A)
< KP . K participant(A)

originates on a regular node.

S. The S penetrator strand is represented is h−gh, +g, +hi. There are two cases to be considered
here. Both cases are symmetrical. In the first case, we have to consider that term(n0 ) = g, whereas
in the second case term(n0 ) = h. Lets proceed with the first case.
Since term(n0 ) ∈ S , t0 @ g and v0 a g. This makes v0 @ h. By the minimality of n0 , v0 @ gh.
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However, v0 , gh, this implies that v0 @ h.
If we consider T = {m ∈ C : m ≺ n0 ∧ gh @ term(m)}. Every member of T is a penetrator node,
because no non-penetrator node contains a subterm gh where h contains any encrypted subterm. T
is non-empty and has a minimal member m by Lemma 1. This minimal member m has a positive
sign by Lemma 2. Now, we have to consider all possible penetrator strands where m can be present.
M. m is a minimal member and thus can not lie on this strand.
F. By the definition of this type of strand, m can not lie on this strand.
T. Since m is a minimal member, it can not lie on this strand.
K. A minimal member of T can not lie on this strand.
S. gh @ term(m), where m is a positive node on a strand p0 of kind S . This can be rejected again
by the minimality property.
E. gh @ term(m), where m is a positive node on a strand p0 of kind E. This leads to the contradiction
of minimality of m in T .
D. gh @ term(m), where m is a positive node on a strand p0 of kind D. By the minimality property,
this strand can be rejected.
C. If gh @ term(m), where m is a positive node on a strand p0 of kind D and m is minimal in T . Then
gh = term(m). This will make the trace of p0 to be equal to h−g, −h, +ghi. This is contradicting the
minimality of n0 in S .
From the application of all such strands, it can be inferred that the node n0 lies on a regular
strand.
The following lemma is a generic one that will help us prove when will a node precede another
node.
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Lemma 6: A node n1 precedes a node n2 on t and term(n1 ) = t0 .
Proof: In order to prove this, we have to focus on the term say t0 ∈ n1 . We also take t1 to be
equal to a nonce value such that t1 = n1 − t0 . Next, we have to identify a node say n0 at which
the term t1 originates. As t1 is chosen to be a nonce, by the basic protocol assumptions it is fair to
assume that this value will be uniquely originated in Σ.
Next we have to identify v0 such that v0 @ term(n0 ) and v0 a term(n2 ). This will establish that
n0 , n2 . We can use this fact to infer that t1 does not originate at n2 . This implies that there is a
node n1 preceding n2 on the same strand such that t1 @ term(n1 ). Now, we can apply the minimality
property of n2 to say that v0 = t0 @ term(n1 ). Since no regular node contains an encrypted term as
a proper subterm, t0 = term(n1 ).
Lemma 7: A regular strand t containing the node n1 and n2 is an initiator strand and is contained in C.
Proof: In order to prove this, we have to establish the fact that n2 is a positive non-penetrator
node that comes after a node n1 . Assume that n1 is of the form {xyz}K . If T is a responder strand, it
will contain a negative node of the above mentioned form. This will establish the statement of the
lemma. Furthermore, if the last node of t is contained in C, it mush have a C-height of the number
of nodes included in C.

4.4 Summary
This chapter contains the modal logic and the proof based models for the security protocol verification that we developed using the Strand Space framework. In our modal logic approach, we
present the logical constructs to model a protocol’s behavior in such a way that the participants can
89

verify different security parameters by looking at their own run of the protocol. In our proof based
model, we present a generic set of proofs to establish the correctness of a security protocol. In
addition, we explain a formal model for security objectives of 802.11i. We present a mathematical
model that provides basis for the correctness proofs of 802.11i. We also present various lemmas
that are going to provide foundation for our proofs in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 5
FORMAL VERIFICATION OF 802.11i

In this chapter, we perform the formal verification of the 802.11i protocol and prove the authentication of the proposed 802.11i protocol. We start with explaining different stages of 802.11i in
Section 5.1. We separate the stages using strong authentication techniques from those that do not
employ strong cryptographic mechanisms. Next, we model these authentication stages of 802.11i
in our proof based approach in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, we carry out the formal verification
of these stages using our proof based approach. We then present the high level abstraction of a
protocol run. We consider a penetrator, empower its capabilities, and evaluate the authentication
of the proposed protocol. Given the constraints and suggestions of the proposed architecture, we
state convincingly that any attempt to defy the authentication mechanism of the 802.11i protocol
will not be successful. We further describe a situation where modifications to our model will lead
to a successful intrusion. Our choice of SSM as a verification framework, is based on its simplicity, elegance, precision of results, and ease of developing simple and powerful proofs even without
automated support.

5.1 Authentication in 802.11i
IEEE 802.11i defines RSNA establishment procedure to address weaknesses in the open system
authentication and the shared key authentication of the 802.11 standard. This section describes
the stages involved in an RSNA establishment, which guarantees strong mutual authentication
and generate fresh TKs for the data confidentiality protocols. The entities involved in an RSNA
establishment are supplicant (STA), authenticator (AP), and authentication server (AS). For the
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purpose of authentication analysis, we divide the RSN operations of 802.11i into five different
stages as shown in Figure 5.1.

5.1.1 Discovery
The first phase in establishing RSNAs is discovery. The AP either broadcasts its 802.11i security
policies through Beacons or responds to Probe requests. The Beacon and Probe Response of an
AP contains its SSID and RSN Information Elements (RSN IEs). The RSN IE carries information
such as enabled authentication suites, unicast suites, and multicast suites. The station uses Probe
requests or advertised Beacon frames of an AP to discover the existence of a network. The discovery phase permits a station to learn the security capabilities of the AP. These security capabilities
include authentication mechanism for the mutual authentication of the AP and the AS, key management mechanism, and confidentiality and integrity protocols for protecting the unicast traffic.
The multicast traffic is dictated by the AP.

5.1.2 Open System and EAP-802.1X Authentication
The second phase in the establishment of an RSNA is authentication where the STA and AP prove
their identities to each other. The authentication stage is further divided into 802.11 open system authentication and EAP-802.1X authentication. Open system authentication is weak and is
included only to provide backward compatibility. The 802.1X standard is used to provide mutual
authentication between a STA and an AS. 802.1X uses the EAP framework that allows the use of
multiple methods for achieving authentication such as static passwords, dynamic passwords, and
public key cryptography certificates.
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Supplicant

Authenticator

Stage 1: Discovery

Stage 2.1: Open System
Authentication

Stage 2.2: EAP-802.1X Authentication

Stage 3.1: 4-Way Handshake

Stage 3.2: Group key Handshake

Stage 4: Secure Communication

Stage 5: Connection Termination

Figure 5.1: RSNA Stages of 802.11i
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Authentication
Server (RADIUS)

In EAP-802.1X, the AP acts as a pass through server between the STA and the AS and blocks
non-authentication traffic between the STA and the AS until the authentication is complete. The
authentication phase provides mutual authentication of a STA and an AS and delivers the Master
Session Key (MSK) to the AP and, sometimes, to the STA. If an RSNA negotiated the PSK AKM
during the discovery, the authentication phase is skipped entirely. The shared key has already
been distributed and installed in an out-of-band manner to provide an implicit authentication. The
message exchange of the EAP-802.1X authentication is explained in Section 3.3.1.2
Intuitively, a successful authentication means that the peer and the authenticator verify the
identity of each other and generate some shared secret for future data transmissions. In Figure 5.1,
we illustrate an abstract model of the 802.11i’s authentication. After the authentication stage, the
peer and the RADIUS server have authenticated each other and generate a common secret called
the Master Session Key (MSK). The peer uses this MSK to derive a Pairwise Master Key (PMK).
The Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) key material on the RADIUS server is
transferred to the authenticator to derive the same PMK in the authenticator.
A mechanism called pre-authentication enables roaming STAs to improve their performances.
Pre-authentication enables a client to establish a PMK security association to an access point with
which the client has yet not been associated. Intuitively, the first time a client associates to the
network, it must do a full authentication. The client can then pre-authenticate to a AP, if it knows
where it will roam. This procedure creates a Pairwise Master Key Security Association (PMKSA)
between the STA and the remote AP. The PMKSA is cached on both the STA and the remote AP.
When the STA enters within range of the previously remote AP, authentication procedure is skipped
and a 4-Way Handshake takes place. The advantage is that the client reduces the time that it is
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disconnected from a network. However, pre-authentication adds an extra load to the authentication
server. The caching of PMKSA can also be enabled to improve performance regardless of the preauthentication and allows the AP and the STA to skip the IEEE 802.1X and the EAP authentications
and start the 4-Way Handshake.

5.1.3 Key Generation and Distribution
After authentication, the participants perform several operations that cause cryptographic keys to
be generated and installed on the AP and the STA. The purpose is to derive and install keys that
will be used in future secure data transfer. Intuitively, in IEEE 802.11i, the Key Generation and
Distribution (KGD) confirms the existence of the Pairwise Master Key (PMK) between the STA
and the AP, ensures the freshness of the security association keys, derives the keys to be used in
future data traffic, install these traffic keys in the AP and STA, distributes a group key for multicast
and broadcast traffic, and confirms the selection of the cipher suite. In order to achieve all these
objectives, a 4-Way Handshake and a Group Key Handshake take place.

5.1.3.1

4-Way Handshake

The 4-Way Handshake confirms the existence of the PMK, the liveness of the peers and the selection of the cipher suite. After a successful handshake, a fresh Pairwise Transient Key (PTK)
for each subsequent session is generated. In [FMG07, FMG06], we analyze the handshake after a
shared PMK is achieved and before the data communication begins.
As shown in Figure 5.1, the 4-Way Handshake involves a frame exchange between the STA and
the AP. The earlier EAP exchange has provided the shared secret key PMK. The 4-way handshake
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must be executed for a successful RSNA despite the fact that PMK is derived from authentication,
reused from a cached PMK, or configured using a PSK. A Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) is generated by concatenating PMK, AP nonce (ANonce), STA nonce (SNonce), AP MAC address and
STA MAC address. The product is then put through a cryptographic hash function. The PTK (64bit) is divided into five separate keys: 16 bytes of EAPOL-Key Encryption Key (KEK), 16 bytes of
EAPOL-Key Confirmation Key (KCK), 16 bytes of Temporal Key (TK), 8 bytes of Michael MIC
Authenticator Tx Key, and 8 bytes of Michael MIC Authenticator Rx Key. The KEK is used by the
AP to encrypt additional data sent (in the ‘Key Data’ field) to the client (for example, the RSN IE
or the GTK). The KCK is used to compute MIC on WPA EAPOL Key message. The TK is used to
encrypt/decrypt unicast data packets. The Michael MIC Authenticator Tx Key is used to compute
MIC on unicast data packets transmitted by the AP. The 8 bytes of Michael MIC Authenticator Rx
Key is used to compute MIC on unicast data packets transmitted by the station. The Michael MIC
Authenticator Tx/Rx Keys provided in the handshake are only used, if the network is using TKIP
to encrypt the data. The handshake also yields the GTK (Group Temporal Key), used to decrypt
multicast and broadcast traffic.
In the first message, the authenticator sends a nonce to the supplicant. This is referred to as
ANonce. The supplicant generates its own nonce, SNonce and calculates the PTK. In the second
message, the supplicant sends its SNonce to the authenticator. The supplicant also sends the security parameters that it used during association. The entire message is protected from modification
using a MIC. MIC is performed by computing a message integrity check over the entire frame and
sending the MIC along with the frame. The AP sends the GTK and a sequence number together
to the STA. This sequence number provides replay protection and is used in the next multicast or
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broadcast frame. Again, the entire message is protected using a MIC. In the fourth message, the
STA sends a confirmation to the AP indicating that the temporal keys are now in place to be used
by the data-confidentiality protocols. At that point, the IEEE 802.1X controlled ports are opened
to allow the flow of frames for data traffic. The MIC protection is mandatory for all frames except
the first frame.

5.1.3.2

Group Key Handshake

The Group Key Handshake is necessary only to support the multicast or the broadcast traffic. In a
two message Group Key handshake, the AP send a new GTK to the STA. The GTK is encrypted
using the KEK assigned to that STA and protects the data from being tampered using a MIC. In
the second message, the STA acknowledges the new GTK. The GTK is 32 bytes and is made up
of 16 bytes of Group Temporal Encryption Key, 8 bytes of Michael MIC Authenticator Tx Key,
and 8 bytes of Michael MIC Authenticator Rx Key. The Group Temporal Encryption Key is used
to encrypt Multicast data packets. The Michael MIC Authenticator Tx Key is used to compute
MIC on Multicast packet transmitted by AP. The Michael MIC Authenticator Rx Key is unused as
stations do not send multicast traffic. The Michael MIC Authenticator Tx/Rx Keys provided in the
handshake are only used, if the network is using TKIP to encrypt the data. The GTK used in the
network may need to be updated due to the expiry of a preset timer or when a device leaves the
network.
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5.1.4 Secure Data Communication
In this stage, the supplicant and the AS exchange frames through the AP using supported data
confidentiality and integrity protocols.

5.1.5 Connection Termination
During this stage, the STA and the AP exchange frames to terminate the existing secure connection.

5.2 Modelling 802.11i using Strand Spaces
In this section, we model 802.11i using the proof based approach. We abstract away the lowerlevel communication details involved in the 802.11i protocol while modeling it using the proof
based approach. In order to prove the authentication property of a protocol, we do not need to
focus on the intricate implementation details of the protocol. Instead, we concentrate on the higher
level abstraction and emphasize on necessary actions to avoid possible attacks by the illegitimate
parties.

5.2.1 Modelling EAP-802.1X Authentication
A sample run of the 802.11i’s EAP-802.1X authentication in terms of SSM is depicted in Figure
5.2.
The authentication starts with an EAPOL-Start message sent to the AP by the supplicant. The
AP sends an EAP-Request/Identity frame to the supplicant. The supplicant replies to the AP with
an EAP-Response/Identity frame. The AP acts as a pass through server and passes this frame to
the RADIUS server as a RADIUS-Access-Request packet. The RADIUS server replies with a
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RADIUS-Access-Challenge packet to the AP. The AP, acting as a pass through server, passes this
frame to the supplicant as an EAP-Request. The EAP-Request is of an appropriate authentication
type and contains relevant challenge information. The supplicant answers this challenge by sending
an EAP-Response packet to the AP. The AP translates this EAP-Response packet into a RadiusAccess-Request packet and forwards it to the RADIUS server. Based on the this Radius-AccessRequest, the RADIUS server grants or rejects access with a Radius-Access-Accept or RadiusAccess-Reject packet respectively. In some implementations, the RADIUS server can continue
the authentication process with further challenges. The AP translates the Radius-Access-Accept
or Radius-Access-Reject packets into the EAP-Success or EAP-Failure packets respectively and
forwards them to the supplicant. If the response from the RADIUS server was accept then the
controlled port is authorized. When the supplicant wants to leave the network, an EAPOL-Logoff
message is sent by the supplicant that sets the controlled port to the initial unauthorized state.
In Figure 5.2, we represent the message exchange between the peer, the authenticator, and the
RADIUS server. P, A, R, and M represent the peer, the authenticator, the RADIUS server and the
message respectively. Note that P, A, R, are the abstractions of the ids of the peer, the authenticator
and the RADIUS server respectively. M is the abstraction of the rest of the communication message. The term, {MPARc1 }KPA , represents a message that is encrypted with a shared secret between
P and A, i.e., (KPA ). The term c1 represents a challenge. The challenges (represented as c1 , c2 , ...),
answers (represented as x1 , x2 , ...) and the challenge response (represented as cr) are the abstractions of combinations of different nonces, shared secrets and keys. This abstraction facilitates the
formal analysis as it hides the lower level communication and cryptographic details. These lower
level communication and cryptographic details are not essential for the authentication analysis,
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although they could improve the security in some sense.

5.2.2 Modelling the 4-way Handshake
In Figure 5.3, we illustrate an abstract model of the 4-way handshake. After the pre-association
and authentication, the client and the RADIUS server have associated with each other and generate a common secret called the Master Session Key (MSK). The client uses this MSK to derive
a Pairwise Master Key (PMK). The Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) key
material on the RADIUS server is transferred to the access point to derive the same PMK in the
access point. The handshake is executed in order to establish a Robust Security Network Association (RSNA). The handshake confirms the existence of the PMK, the liveness of the peers, and the
selection of the cipher suite. After a successful handshake, a fresh Pairwise Transient Key (PTK)
for each subsequent session is generated.
The A and C in Figure 5.3 corresponds to ids of the access point and the client respectively
whereas Na and Nc are nonces of the access point and the client respectively. We use s to denote
sequence number, MIC for Message Integrity Code, GT K for Group Temporal Key, and M is the
abstraction of the rest of the communication message. K is the set of shared keys and is represented
as Ki j where {i,j} ∈ C, A. K pen ∈ K is the set of keys held by the penetrator. MK ∈ M is the message
M encrypted with the key K.

5.3 Authentication Proofs
In this section, we carry out algebraic operations to prove the authentication of 802.11i. A protocol
needs to ascertain that the messages are intact and that no secret is divulged during its execution.
100

Peer (P)

Authenticator (A)
{M P A}

RADIUS server (R)

{M P Aq1}KP A

{M P Ax1}KP A

{M P ARx1}KRA

{M P ARc1}KRA

{M P ARc1}KP A

{M P ARx2}KP A

{M P ARx2}KRA

{M P ARcr}KRA

{M P ARcr}KP A
Figure 5.2: A Strand Space Representation of EAP-802.1X in 802.11i.
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Client

Access Point

Pairwise Master Key (PMK)

Pairwise Master Key (PMK)
A, Na, s, M

Message 2 = M

C, Nc , s, RSN IEc, MIC, M
A, Na, s+1, RSN IEa, MIC, GTK, M

Message 4 = M

Message 1 = M

Message 3 = M

C, Nc, s+1, MIC, M

Figure 5.3: An Abstract Representation of the 4-way Handshake of 802.11i
Our focus is to prove the authentication property in which each participant involved in the communication should be certain that the messages are coming from the legitimate participants. In terms
of strand space formalism, encrypted messages should originate from the regular strands. We make
use of the ideal cryptography and algebra freeness assumptions provided in Section 5.3.1.

5.3.1 Assumptions
We lay out our assumptions in this Section. Our set of assumptions is in accordance with the
assumptions set forth by other researchers in the related area.
1. In a protocol environment, each participant is associated with a unique ID. Moreover, for
each ID there is a key (or a pair of public-private keys in case of asymmetric cryptosystem)
associated with it.
2. In the present work, we do not consider encrypting a message more than once. Earlier
work has shown that double or multiple encryptions do not serve a better purpose than a
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single encryption. Instead, sometimes it is detrimental to encrypt a message more than once
[DY83].
3. In literature of security protocols, a penetrator is generally assumed to be a legitimate participant of the network. The legitimate participant becomes a penetrator when he behaves in
an undesired manner.
4. We assume ideal cryptography where all participants share limited computational and cryptanalytic abilities.
5. For analysis purposes, we confine ourselves to a single penetrator. It is shown that increasing
the number of penetrators does not increase the probability of a successful attack. A single
penetrator can be modeled such that it emulates any number of penetrators [Low96].
6. We assume our algebra to be freely generated as is assumed in [FHG99, GF02].

5.3.2 Defining the Authentication Security Objective
The authentication can be defined using the agreement property presented in [Low97, Low99]. A
protocol guarantees a participant B (say, as the responder) agreement for certain data items x if:
Each time a participant B completes a run of the protocol as responder using x, apparently with A,
then there is a unique run of the protocol with the principal A as initiator using x, apparently with
B.
A weaker non-injective agreement does not ensure uniqueness, but requires only: Each time a
participant B completes a run of the protocol as responder using x, apparently with A, then there
exists a run of the protocol with the principal A as initiator using x, apparently with B. We used
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this property for defining a heuristic state space search model for the authentication of security
protocols in [FMG04].

5.3.3 Proving EAP-802.1X
We present our theoretical model for EAP-802.1X in this section. Figure 5.2 represents a bundle B1
in a strand space Σ where the participants have disjoint ids. The nodes in Figure 5.2 are represented
by little circles.

5.3.3.1

Theoretical Model

We represent the peer, the authenticator, and the RADIUS server by P, A and R respectively. M
represents the set of messages exchanged among the participants. We define T name ∈ {P, A, R } and
N ∈ {P, R}. K is the set of shared keys and is represented as Ki j where {i,j} ∈ T name . K pen ∈ K
is the set of keys held by the penetrator. MK ∈ M is the message M encrypted with the key K.
The set of questions asked by the authenticator is denoted by the set q = {q1, q2, q3,...}. The set
c = {c1, c2, c3, ...} represents the challenges raised by the RADIUS server. The challenge response
cr indicates a success or a failure. The set x = {x1, x2, x3, ...} is the set of answers given by the
peer.
The set of queries is represented by Q = c

S

q. The single arrow, →, indicates that a message

is sent to another participant. The double arrow, ⇒, connects two successive nodes on the same
strand. The peer strand is represented as S peer and is equal to Peer[P, M, R, A, ci , q j , xk , KPA ]. This
strand is a symbolic representation of infinite instantiations of the peer strand. From 5.2, the trace
of the peer strand can be represented as follows:
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h+{PAM}, −{MPAq1 }KPA , +{MPAx1 }KPA , −{MPARc1 }KPA , −{MPARc1 }KPA , −{MPARc1 }KPA ,
−{MPARc1 }KPA , +{MPARx2 }KPA , −{MPARcr }KPA i.

Similarly, the authenticator strand S auth is represented as Auth[P, M, R, A, ci , q j , xk , KNA ]. We
represent the trace of the authenticator strand as:
h−{MPA}, +{MPAq1 }KPA , −{MPAx1 }KPA , +{MPARx1 }KRA , −{MPARc1 }KRA , +{MPARx1 }KRA ,
−{MPARc1 }KRA , +{MPARc1 }KPA , −{MPARx2 }KPA , +{MPARx2 }KRA , −{MPARcr }KRA i.
The Radius strand S RADIUS is equal to Radius[P, M, R, A, xk , c j , KNA ]. We represent the trace of the
RADIUS strand as:
h−{MPARx1 }KRA , +{MPARc1 }KRA , −{MPARx2 }KRA , +{MPARcr }KRA i.
After formally representing EAP-802.1X, we begin by proving the authentication property of
the protocol. We make use of the agreement property to claim that if the peer completes its protocol run with a unique set of parameters, it can be inferred that the authenticator and the RADIUS
server must also have completed their part of protocol run using the same set of parameters. Authentication is guaranteed in both directions, that is, the peer authenticates the authenticator and
the authenticator authenticates the peer. The RADIUS server is assumed to be authentic in 802.11i.

5.3.3.2

Peer’s Authentication

A bundle represents a unique run of a protocol. Unique refers to a specific set of parameters
used in only one protocol run in the entire strand space. Consider a strand space Σ in which a
bundle B1 represents a protocol run. SSM defines authentication in terms of bundle-height of
strands of legitimate parties. If a strand S peer ∈ Σ represents a peer strand in a bundle B1 , then
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the RADIUS and the authenticator strands should also lie in the same bundle B1 to ensure that the
peer, the authenticator and the RADIUS server are involved in the same session of the protocol.
The presence of the peer (S peer ), the authenticator (S auth ) and the RADIUS server (S RADIUS ) in the
same bundle B1 guarantees that the peer is talking to the legitimate authenticator and the RADIUS
server and not with any masquerading agent.
We represent the peer strand S peer = Peer[P, M, R, A, ci , q j , xk , KNA ], the authenticator strand
S auth = Auth[P, M, R, A, ci , q j , xk , KNA ]. Similarly, the strand of the Radius server is given as
S RADIUS = Radius[P, M, R, A, xk , c j , KNA ].
Theorem 1: If S peer has the bundle-height of 6 then for a unique set of questions and answers,
there will be authenticator and RADIUS strands of bundle-height 10 and 4 respectively.
Proof 1: Proof of theorem 1 will imply that both the authenticator and the RADIUS server have
completed their protocol run with matching variables in the same session with the peer.
The trace of the strand S peer ∈ Peer[P, M, R, A, ci , q j , xk , KNA ], as can be seen in Figure 5.2, is
given below:
h+{MPA}, −{MPAq1 }KPA , +{MPAx1 }KPA , −{MPARc1 }KPA , +{MPARx2 }KPA , −{MPARcr }KPA i
We need to prove that the term {MPARcr }KPA originates on a regular node in the bundle B1 .
This proof will help in determining the bundle-height of the authenticator.
Theorem 1.1: {MPARcr }KPA originates on a regular node in the bundle B1 .
Proof 1.1: Consider the bundle B1 in Σ. We assume that KNA < K pen . Intuitively, this assumption
implies that the penetrator does not possess the secret keys of any other participant. We need to
prove that any term encrypted with KNA must originate only on the regular nodes in a bundle. Since
KNA (= {KPA , KRA }) < K pen , we just need to show that any regular node does not generate the key
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KNA . The traces of the peer (S peer ), the authenticator (S auth ), and the RADIUS (S RADIUS ) server
show that no key is a subterm of any term of these traces.
We need to prove that KPA is generated on a regular node. We will prove this by showing that
KPA is not generated on a penetrator node. We consider the case in which the penetrator generates
this secret. As we assumed that KPA < set of penetrator keys, we discuss the possible set of actions
that a penetrator can take in the following lines.
Message: The penetrator strand of this type is h+termi. The Message strand has only one
positive node. This means that the penetrator emits a term without previously obtaining it from
anywhere. In our case, the term is equal to {MPARcr }KPA . Since any penetrator can not originate a
term encrypted with the key KPA , this implies that Σ lacks the message strand.
Flushing: The flushing represents a strand h−termi which indicates that the penetrator received
a term from somewhere and then flushed it. We claim that {MPARcr }KPA is not originated by the
penetrator because an originating node is always a positive node. We do not need to worry about
any strand with only negative nodes because a negative node does not imply origination.
T ee: Its trace has a strand of the form h−term, +term, +termi. The tee strand shows that the
penetrator received a term and then forwarded that term twice. As the penetrator received a term
in the first node, the term could not have been originated by the penetrator. So {MPARcr }KPA was
not originated on a Tee strand.
Concatenation: Its strand is of the form h−term1, −term2, +term1term2i. The penetrator received two terms, concatenated them to form a new term and then forwarded the concatenated
term. Considering our algebra to be free, no new term can be obtained by simply concatenating
other terms. Hence, no new term is generated at the positive node of the concatenation strand.
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Instead, the penetrator is sending a concatenated term. So {MPARcr }KPA is not originated on a
concatenation strand.
S eparation: The trace of separation is h−term1term2, +term1, +term2i. Since penetrator is
getting both the terms, term1 and term2, from the previous node, the separation strand lacks any
positive originating node.
Key: This strand emits the key h+Ki. The algebra freeness assumption guarantees that a key
cannot be equal to any encrypted message. So {MPARcr }KPA cannot be generated by the key penetrator strand.
Encryption: Its strand can be written as h−K, −term, +{term}K i. The trace of encryption states
that the {term}K is equal to {MPARcr }KPA . Using algebra freeness, if two encrypted terms are equivalent, the only possibility is that the term is equal to {MPARcr } and K is equal to KPA . It means
that the penetrator receives the key KPA in its first node. We assume that any legitimate participant never sends any secret without encryption. Therefore, encryption strand does not produce
{MPARcr }KPA .
Decryption: The decryption strand has the trace h−K −1 , −{term}K , +termi. As the positive term
is obtained by decrypting the previous node, no positive node serves as an originator.
After ruling out all the possible penetrator strands, it is safe to conclude that {MPARcr }KPA
originates on a regular node in B. Equivalently, this proof can also be extended for {MPARcr }KRA .
The proof os this is similar to the proof 1.1. However, we will prove that {MPARcr }KRA originates
on the RADIUS strand. We present this proof in the following lines.
Theorem 1.2: {MPARcr }KRA originates on the RADIUS strand.
Proof 1.2: We have proved that {MPARcr }KPA originates on a regular node in proof 1.1. Since
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cr is a subterm of the {term}KPA , it implies that cr originates on a regular node. If cr is a subterm
of {term}KRA , then it is clear from the traces of regular strands that this term originates only on the
RADIUS strand. We know that cr can not originate on the penetrator strand. Hence, {MPARcr }KRA
belongs to the RADIUS strand where M is any message, {PAR} ∈ T name , and cr is the challenge
response.
The term {MPARcr }KRA is present on the last node on the RADIUS strand. According to the
bundle property, a bundle must contain all the previous nodes that collectively makes the bundleheight to be equal to 4.
Since all the messages are encrypted with symmetric keys and we assume that KPA and KRA do
not belong to K pen , we say that no penetrator can sit in the middle and behave as a regular participant by simply forwarding the messages to the legitimate parties. The keys KPA and KRA are shared
between the peer and the authenticator, and the authenticator and the RADIUS server respectively.
Hence, all the messages arriving at any regular node must be originated on the legitimate strands.
The peer receives the term {MPARcr }KPA in its last message of the peer strand that makes the peer
height equal to 6. Since this message occurs in the last node of the authenticator strand, according
to the bundle property it must contain all the previous nodes that makes the bundle-height of the
authenticator equals to 10. Similarly, the RADIUS server strand possesses the term {MPARcr }KRA
on its 4th node which makes the RADIUS server’s height equals to 4. Thus authenticator’s height
is equal to the peer’s height plus the RADIUS server’s height, i.e, 4 + 6 = 10. This also implicitly
guarantees that the authenticator is not rogue because it has to have the secret keys to forward
messages between the peer and the RADIUS Server.
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5.3.3.3

Authenticator’s Authentication

Consider a strand space Σ with the bundle B1 representing a protocol run. We proceed by stating
that if a bundle contains a strand S auth ∈ Σ then the peer and the RADIUS strands will agree with
the authenticator.
Theorem 2: Assume a typical run of the protocol in which the RADIUS server challenges the
peer. If S auth ∈ Authenticator[P, A, M, R, ci , q j , xk , KNA ] of B-height of at least 9, then there are
regular strands such that:
1. S peer ∈ Peer[P, A, M, R, ci , q j , xk , KPA ] of B-height at least 5.
2.S radius ∈ Radius[P, A, M, R, ci , x j , KRA ] of B-height = 4.
Proof 2: The trace S auth can be written as: h−{MPA}, +{MPAq1 }KPA , −{MPAx1 }KPA ,
−{MPAx1 }KPA , +{MPARx1 }KRA , −{MPARc1 }KRA ,+{MPARc1 }KPA , −{MPARx2 }KPA
−{MPARx2 }KPA , +{MPARx2 }KRA , −{MPARcr }KRA i.
We do not take the trivial case in which the RADIUS server does not challenge the peer. We
assumed that KRA < K pen . By using a proof similar to proof 1.1, we can infer that {MPARcr }KRA
originates on a regular node in the bundle. Using proof 1.2, we can say that the term {MPARcr }KRA
originates on the RADIUS server strand. Using theorems 1.1 and 1.2, we can conclude that the
bundle-height of the RADIUS server strand is equal to 4. Similarly, using theorem 1.1 we can
conclude that the term {MPAx2 }KPA lies on a regular peer strand. Since {MPAx2 }KPA is the last node
on the peer strand, bundle property makes the bundle-height of the peer equal to 5.
The term +{MPA} is not necessarily an encrypted message. Even if some intruder tries to
impersonate as a legitimate user, the reply from the authenticator is encrypted by a shared key
between the authenticator and the legitimate user. The intruder will not be able to reply to the
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authenticator with the term +{MPAx1 }KPA . We need to emphasize the fact that the authenticator
can not guarantee the bundle-height of its strand to exceed from 9 because any penetrator can
sit in the middle and throw away (flush) messages among regular parties. The basic notion is
the guarantee that if a message encrypted with a secret key is received by a participant, then that
message must have originated on a regular strand. However, we can not guarantee that a message
sent by a legitimate party will always be received.

5.3.3.4

Case Analysis

We present a scenario where peer-authenticator communication is not supported by a shared secret. In a case in which the authenticator forwards messages to the peer after communicating
with the RADIUS server, we expect a man-in-the-middle attack by a penetrator lying in between
the peer and the authenticator. The penetrator possesses a strand of the form Tee with a trace
h−term, +term, +termi. In this strand, the penetrator gets a message from a legitimate party and
forwards it without changing it. The penetrator may apply multiple strands to form a complex
attack. In the scenario presented above, any penetrator lying in the middle can pose itself as a
legitimate participant to the peer, the authenticator, or to both.
The authenticator acts as a gateway between the peer and the RADIUS server. It first decrypts
the incoming messages using its shared secret with the source and then forwards the outgoing
messages after encrypting it using a shared secret with the destination. In Figure 5.4, a penetrator
P pen behaves as an authenticator and engages the peer into a protocol run. If the penetrator starts
communicating with the authenticator, a hostile situation may exist. Consider a public key system
in which the penetrator starts running the protocol by simply forwarding the messages between

111

Peer (P)

Penetrator

{M P PP en }

Authenticator (A)
{M APP en }

{M Aq1PP en }KP en

{M P q1PP en }KP

{M Ax1PP en }KA

{M P x1PP en }KP en

Figure 5.4: Case Analysis of 802.11i.
the peer and the authenticator. In this way, a penetrator may be able to get all the secret questions
answered and gets authenticated. The rest of the protocol proceeds as normal. The penetrator
behaves as an authenticator for the peer and as a peer for the authenticator as shown in Figure 5.4.

5.3.4 Proving 4-Way Handshake
We present our theoretical model in this Section. Figure 5.3 represents a bundle B2 in the strand
space Σ where the participants have disjoint ids. The nodes in Figure 5.3 are represented by little
circles.

5.3.4.1

Theoretical Model

A bundle represents a unique run of a protocol. Unique refers to a specific set of parameters used
in only one protocol run in the entire strand space. Consider a strand space Σ in which bundle
B2 represents a protocol run. SSM defines authentication in terms of bundle-height of strands of
legitimate parties. If a strand S client ∈ Σ represents a client strand in a bundle B2 , then the access
point’s strand should also lie in the same bundle B2 to ensure that the client and the access point
are involved in the same session of the protocol. The presence of the client (S client ) and the access
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point (S ap ) in the same bundle B2 guarantees that both access point and client are legitimate.
We represent the client’s strand S client to be equal to
Client[C, A, M, Na , Nc , s, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEc , RS NIEa , GT K], and the access point’s strand S ap
to be equal to AP[C, A, M, Na , Nc , s, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEc , RS NIEa , GT K].

5.3.4.2

Client’s Authentication

We perform the Client’s authentication in the following lines.
Theorem 3: If S client has the bundle-height of 3 then for a unique set of nonces, there will be an
access point strand of bundle-height 3.
Proof 3: Proof of theorem 3 will imply that the access point has completed its protocol run
with matching variables in the same session with the client.
The trace of the strand S client ∈ Client[C, A, M, Na , Nc , s, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEc , RS NIEa , GT K],
as can be seen in Figure 5.3, is given below:
h−{A, Na , M, s}KCA , +{C, Nc , M, s, MIC, RS NIEc }KCA , −{A, Na , M, s+1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA ,
+{C, Nc , M, s + 1, MIC}KCA .
We need to prove that the term {A, Na , M, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA originates on a regular
node in the bundle B. This proof will help in determining the bundle-height of the access point.
Theorem 3.1: {A, Na , M, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA originates on a regular node in the
bundle B.
Proof 3.1: Consider a bundle B2 in Σ. We assume that KCA < K pen . Intuitively, this assumption
implies that the penetrator does not possess the secret keys of any other participant. We need to
prove that any term encrypted with KCA must originate only on the regular nodes in a bundle. Since
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KCA < K pen , we just need to show that any regular node does not generate the key KCA . The traces
of the peer (S client ) and the access point (S ap ) show that no key is a subterm of any term of these
traces.
We need to prove that KCA is generated on a regular node. We will prove this by showing that
KCA is not generated on a penetrator node. We consider the case in which the penetrator generates
this secret. As we assumed that KCA < set of penetrator keys, we discuss the possible set of actions
that a penetrator can take in the following lines.
Message: The penetrator strand of this type is h+termi. The Message strand has only one
positive node. This means that the penetrator emits a term without previously obtaining it from
anywhere. In our case, the term is equal to {A, Na , M, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA . Since any
penetrator can not originate a term encrypted with the key KCA , this implies that Σ lacks the message strand.
Flushing: The flushing represents a strand h−termi which indicates that the penetrator received
a term from somewhere and then flushed it. We claim that {A, Na , M, s+1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA
is not originated by the penetrator because an originating node is always a positive node. We do
not need to worry about any strand with only the negative nodes because a negative node does not
imply origination.
T ee: Its trace has a strand of the form h−term, +term, +termi. The tee strand shows that the
penetrator received a term and then forwarded that term twice. As the penetrator received a term
in the first node, the term could not have been originated by the penetrator. So {A, Na , M, s +
1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA was not originated on a Tee strand.
Concatenation: Its strand is of the form h−term1, −term2, +term1term2i. The penetrator re114

ceived two terms, concatenated them to form a new term and then forwarded the concatenated
term. Considering our algebra to be free, no new term can be obtained by simply concatenating
other terms. Hence, no new term is generated at the positive node of the concatenation strand. Instead, the penetrator is sending a concatenated term. So {A, Na , M, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA
is not originated on a concatenation strand.
S eparation: The trace of separation is h−term1term2, +term1, +term2i. Since penetrator is
getting both the terms, term1 and term2, from the previous node, the separation strand lacks any
positive originating node.
Key: This strand emits the key h+Ki. The algebra freeness assumption guarantees that a key
cannot be equal to any encrypted message. So {A, Na , M, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA cannot be
generated by the key penetrator strand.
Encryption: Its strand can be written as h−K, −term, +{term}K i. The trace of encryption states
that the {term}K is equal to {A, Na , M, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA . Using algebra freeness, if
two encrypted terms are equivalent, the only possibility is that the term is equal to {A, Na , M, s +
1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K} and K is equal to KCA . It means that the penetrator receives the key KCA in
its first node. We assume that any legitimate participant never sends any secret without encryption.
Therefore, encryption strand does not produce {A, Na , M, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA .
Decryption: The decryption strand has the trace h−K −1 , −{term}K , +termi. As the positive term
is obtained by decrypting the previous node, no positive node serves as an originator.
After ruling out all the possible penetrator strands, it is safe to conclude that {A, Na , M, s +
1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA originates on a regular node in B2 . Since all the messages are encrypted
with symmetric keys and we assume that KCA does not belong to K pen , we say that no penetrator
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can sit in the middle and behave as a regular participant by simply forwarding the messages to
the legitimate parties. The key KCA is shared between the client and the access point. Hence, all
messages arriving at any regular node must be originated on the legitimate strands. The client
receives the term {A, Na , M, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA in its last message of the client strand
that makes the peer height equals to 3. Since this message occurs in the last node of the access
point, according to the bundle property it must contain all the previous nodes that makes the bundleheight of the access point equals to 4. Thus access point’s height is equal to the client’s height, i.e,
3.

5.3.4.3

Authenticator’s Authentication

Consider a strand space Σ with the bundle B representing a protocol run. We proceed by stating
that if a bundle contains a strand S ap ∈ Σ then the client’s strand will agree with the access point’s
strand.
Theorem 4: If S ap ∈ AP[C, A, M, Na , Nc , s, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEc , RS NIEa , GT K] of B-height of
at least 4, then there is a regular strand of the client such that:
S client = Client[C, A, M, Na , Nc , s, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEc , RS NIEa , GT K] of B-height equals to 4.
Proof 4: The trace S ap can be written as: h+{A, Na , M, s}KCA , −{C, Nc , M, s, MIC, RS NIEc }KCA ,
+{A, Na , M, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA , −{C, Nc , M, s + 1, MIC}KCA .
We assumed that KCA < K pen . By using a proof similar to proof 3.1, we can infer that the
term equal to {C, Nc , M, s + 1, MIC}KCA , originates on a regular node in the bundle. And hence
similar to proof 3, we can conclude that the bundle-height of the access point’s strand is equal to
4. Since {C, Nc , M, s + 1, MIC}KCA is the last node on the client’s strand, bundle property makes the

116

bundle-height of the client to be equal to 4.

5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have performed the authentication analysis of 802.11i protocol using a proof
based approach. We divide 802.11i in five different stages: discovery, open system and EAP802.1X authentication, key generation and distribution, secure data communication, and connection termination. The only two stages that guarantee authentication in 802.11i are EAP-802.1X
authentication and 4-way handshake. We model these stages in the proof based approach. After
modelling these stages, we develop a theoretical model and build proofs of authentication for the
802.11i protocol. We also present a special case and analyze it to show how modifications in our
model can compromise authentication by causing a man-in-the-middle attack.
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CHAPTER 6
A MULTI-AGENT APPROACH FOR SECURITY PROTOCOL VERIFICATION

An agent is anything that can be viewed as perceiving its environment through sensors and acting
upon that environment through effectors [RN95]. A Multi-agent System (MAS) can be characterized as a system composed of several agents that aim to solve problems collectively. These problems are difficult to achieve by an individual agent. The distinguishing characteristics of MASs
are:
1. each agent has incomplete information or capabilities for solving the problem and, thus, has
a limited viewpoint,
2. there is no system global control,
3. data are decentralized, and
4. computation is asynchronous.
A MAS can be viewed as a distributed parallel computer system where each agent (participant)
communicates with other agents. A primary aim of MAS systems is to achieve flexibility and fault
tolerance. A MAS system should be modifiable without much rewriting. In addition, these systems
are designed to facilitate rapid self-recovery.
We present a new approach that includes the notion of multi-agent in the formal verification
of security protocols [GFM07a, GFM07b]. In particular, our focus is to verify the authentication
property in a multi-agent environment. The intuition is to capture the behavior of a distributed
system as a multi-agent system. An agent is an abstraction that is used in the distributed systems to
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represent an entity such as a process or a principal. It is important to give a clear notion of multiagent systems in the proposed frameworks for security protocol verification in order to represent
the formal model of knowledge. For example, the limitation of SSM is that it assumes that all the
information available to a principal is either supplied initially or is contained in messages received
by that principal [HP03]. However, other important information may also be available to a principal
in a security setting, such as a principal may combine information from different roles played by
him in the protocol. The presented model captures the formal model of knowledge and belief of
agents over time. We also present a formal proof of authentication of the 4-way handshake in the
802.11i protocol.

6.1 The Multi-agent Theoretical Model
In this section, we describe the participants involved in a security protocol and their behavior. The
participants or agents in our protocol consists of honest agents and the penetrator. Our model is
an asynchronous composition of a set of these honest agents and the penetrator. The strength of
our system is that we assume the presence of an insecure communication channel. We model this
insecure communication channel in a way where an honest agent has no guarantees about the origin
of a message and every communication goes through the penetrator. We define the penetrator and
its abilities in the following section.

6.1.1 Penetrator
In our model, the penetrator (or intruder or adversary) is a user of the system that tries to impersonate himself as some other honest agent of the system. The penetrator is assumed to have the
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ability to eavesdrop on every communication and generate fake messages. Intuitively, every sent
message is intercepted by the penetrator and all messages received by honest agents were actually
sent by the penetrator. We also allow the penetrator to create and destroy messages. The complete
set of abilities of a penetrator is defined as follows.
Generation A penetrator is generally assumed to generate messages from the set of messages he
possesses. He may generate new messages using some operations performed on this set.
Forwarding Forwarding is defined as sending a message after receiving it from some participant.
A penetrator is equipped with the ability to forward any message in the network to any
participant he likes.
Copying Message copying can be done by simply duplicating the data item even though the ingredients of the data items are unknown to a participant. The notion of a penetrator possess
this property that he can copy any message to create it duplicates as many times as he wants
in order to attack a protocol.
Deleting A penetrator can obtain any message from the network and then can flush it out from the
network. This is similar to deleting of messages from a public network channel.
Concatenation A penetrator is assumed to be able to perform concatenation on two messages he
possesses.
Encryption A penetrator is assumed to able to encrypt any data item it possess with any key he
possesses. This can result in infinite number of messages that a penetrator can generate by
simply encrypting a message over and over using a key. However, in a realistic scenario,
120

only a bounded number of encryption suffices the analysis.
Decryption Similar to encryption, a penetrator is capable of decrypting a message using a key he
possesses. The key may have been obtained by any successful attack on a protocol, or he
may have performed cryptanalysis on any old session key to obtain the key.
However, we make use of the general set of assumptions set forth by the researchers in our area and
put a bound on the capability of every participant involved in a protocol. This set of assumption is
described in Section 5.3.1.

6.1.2 Messages
Before building a model for security protocol analysis, it is important to describe a complete description of the behavior of agents involved in a typical security protocol. In the following lines,
we provide the description of messages in our model.
The messages involved in a protocol are constructed from smaller submessages using concatenation and encryption. The smallest submessage are the ones that do not contain any further
submessage. These smallest submessages are called atomic messages. An atomic message can
belong to any of the following four types.
1. The Agent name is used to refer to a participant in a protocol.
2. A Nonce is a randomly generated number. A nonce is generated only once during the course
of a protocol. The purpose is to ensure that no one can predict the value of a nonce. A
message containing a newly generated nonce is assumed to be fresh.
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3. A Key is used to encrypt messages. Every key k has an inverse k−1 . However, for symmetric
cryptography, the decryption key is the same as the encryption key, so k = k−1 .
4. Data message have no role in protocol functionality. It is simply intended to be communicated between the agents involved in a protocol.
Let M be the set of all messages such that it contains all possible atomic messages. The set M
is constructed as follows:
Concatenation Two messages m1 ∈ M and m2 ∈ M can be paired together to form a new message
m1 .m2 ∈ M;
Encryption A message m ∈ M can be encrypted with a key k to form an encrypted message
mk ∈ M.
Projection A message m1 .m2 ∈ M can be projected to form m1 ∈ M and m2 ∈ M;
Decryption A message mk ∈ M can be decrypted using a key k−1 ∈ K ∈ M(in antisymmetric
cryptography system) or k ∈ K ∈ M (in symmetric cryptography system) to form m ∈ M
and k ∈ K ∈ M. The set K ∈ M represents the set of all possible keys.

6.2

Syntax

We use modal logic to express notions of knowledge. Let A be the set of agents named 1,...,n. The
set of model operators for A is a1 , a2 , ..., an . The set of primitive propositions Φ is a nonempty set
describing basic facts about the world. To express a statement such as ”Client 2 knows that the
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key Z is fresh,” we write a2 φ. Here, a2 ∈ A represents client (or agent) 2 and φ ∈ Φ is a primitive
proposition stating that the key Z is fresh.
The argument to the primitive propositions are terms. The formal description of terms is as
follows.
• If A is any agent’s ID, then A is an agent term.
• If a is an agent’s variable, then a is an agent term.
• If M is a message, then M is a message term.
• If m is a message variable, then m is a message term.
• If K is a key, then K is a key term as well as a message term. The term k signifies a key term
but is also a message term because k ∈ K ∈ M
• If k is a key variable, then k is a key term as well as a message term.
• If m1 and m2 are message terms, then m1.m2 is a message term.
• If m and k are message terms, then mk is a message term.
We define the set of formulas by closing off under negation, conjunction, and the modal operators. The well-formed formulas are built up from primitive propositions with modal and first-order
logic as follows.
• if φ is an atomic proposition, then φ is a WFF.
• if φ is a WFF, then ¬φ is a WFF.
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• if φ1 and φ2 are WFFs then φ1 ∧ φ2 is a WFF.
• if φ is a WFF and a is an agent term then ∃a.φ is a WFF. Here, ∃a.φ means that there exists
some agent a0 such that φ is true when you substitute a0 for a in φ.
We also utilize standard propositional logic abbreviations to form more complicated formulas,
such as:
• φ ∨ ψ for ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ),
• φ → ψ for ¬φ ∨ ψ,
• φ ↔ ψ for (φ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ),
• and ∀a.φ for ¬∃a.¬φ.
A statement such as ”Client 1 knows that the key Z is fresh and Client 2 knows that the key Z is
not fresh,” can be represented in our language as a1 φ ∧ a2 ¬φ. Here, a1 and a2 are ∈ A and represent
client 1 and client 2 respectively. Also, φ ∈ Φ is a primitive proposition stating that the key Z is
fresh and ¬φ implies that the key Z is not fresh.

6.3 Semantics
In a multi-agent system, every agent is characterized by a local state at a given point in time.
• The local state of an agent contains all the information necessary to model the behavior of
that agent at a given point in time. In our Asynchronous Message Passing (a.m.p.) system,
the local state of an agent contains the values of variables, history of messages received and
sent, and a list of internal actions performed.
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• The global state of the system at any time t consists of all the local states of its agents at time
t.
• A run of the system is defined as a function from time to the global states. A run is a
complete description of how the system evolves over time.
• A point is a pair (r, t) comprising of a run r and time t.
• The global state r(t) describes the state of the system at a point (r, t). r(t) = (s1 , s2 , ..., sn ),
where si = agent i’s local state at point (r, t).
• A round takes place between two time points. For example, round t in run r takes place
between time t and t − 1.
• The history of an agent a ∈ A, over M, at point (r, t), consists of a0 s initial state followed by
the sequence describing a0 s actions up to time t. If a performs no actions in round t then its
history at (r, t) is the same as its history at (r, t − 1). In a.m.p. system, the agent a’s history at
any point (r, t) is its local state at point (r, t) and can be represented as ra (t). The history ra (t)
describes everything that has happened in the run r up to time t from agent a0 s point of view.
• Let E be the set of events. An event e ∈ E occurs in a0 s history in round t of run r if e
is in ra (t) but not in ra (t − 1). In a security protocol, the primitive events are of the form
send(m, a, b)(i.e., agent a sends m to agent b) and receive(m, a, b)(i.e., m is received by
agent a from b). An agent can also perform internal events (or internal actions) specific to
a security protocol, for example, fresh(m) (which checks wether the term m is fresh or not)
etc.
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The local states of the agents changes as they perform events (or actions) during the course of a
protocol. The action performed by the participants as well as the change in their states are reflected
in their histories. Actions also cause the global state of the system to change. A message m ∈ M is
sent by an agent a1 ∈ A in global state r(t) and the global state changes to r(t + 1) if and only if:
• There is a session history Hk (t) with rk (t) contains an action send(m). Intuitively, this means
that is a session history that indicates that a message m was sent.
Similarly, a message m ∈ M is received by an agent a1 ∈ A in global state r(t) and the global state
changes to r(t + 1) if and only if:
• There is a session history Hk (t) with rk (t + 1) contains an action receive(m). This means that
is a session history that indicates that a message m was received.
We need to make sure that the global states of our system are consistent over time. This can
be achieved if histories do not shrink over time and every message m ∈ M received in round t
corresponds to a message that was sent in some earlier round. Following three constraints are
defined to ensure that the global states of the system are consistent.
C1. ra (t) is a history over M;
C2. for every event receive(m) in ra (t) there exists a corresponding event sent(m) in rb (t), for some
b ∈ A;
C3. ra (0) is the empty sequence and ra (t + 1) is either identical to ra (t) or the result of appending
one event to ra (t).
C1 simply states that an agent’s local state is its history. The constraint C2 says that every message
received at round t corresponds to one that was sent earlier. C3 ensures that histories do not shrink
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over time.

6.4 Theoretical Model for the 4-Way Handshake of 802.11i
After laying out the formal multi-agent framework, the next step is to translate the participants and
communication of the 4-way handshake into the multi-agent framework. We utilize the bundle
structure of Strand Space Model (SSM) [FHG99] to capture the evaluation of agents in time. Next,
we use the Strand System notion of [HP03] to capture the evolution of bundles in time. Each time
an event takes place for any agent a ∈ A, we write B1 7→ B2 . With every such event, the mapping
B1 7→ B2 grows and forms a chain B1 7→ B2 7→ B3 ....
For a chain C = B1 7→ B2 ... and an agent a ∈ A, the history histan (C), can be defined inductively.
The initial history hista0 (C) for agent a ∈ A is h i. The hista1 (C) is h i if no event happens for a,
otherwise, it can be obtained by appending hista0 (C) to ea ,B0 7→B1 , where ea is the event in B0 7→ B1
for the agent a ∈ A. Similarly, histan (C) is histan−1 (C) if no event happened in Bn−1 7→ Bn for a and
histan−1 (C).ea ,Bn−1 7→Bn if an event happens for agent a in Bn−1 7→ Bn .
From the communication in Figure 5.3, the evolution of system is captured as follows. We
denote access point with ap, client with cl, and environment with en. Environment en is assumed to
have all the control over communication channel. Whenever an agent sends or receives a message,
that message is sent or received through the environment. Also, for the sake of simplicity, we
assume the time to be long enough so that a message is send by an agent and received by the
environment (and vice versa) in one frame.
The initial histories of all agents is histA0 (C) = hi.
The events for ap causes the bundles to grow like eap ,B0 7→B1 , eap ,B1 7→B2 , eap ,B2 7→B3 ,
127

eap ,B3 7→B4 , eap ,B4 7→B5 ,eap ,B5 7→B6 , eap ,B6 7→B7 , eap ,B7 7→B8 , ....
1
0
(C) = histap
(C).send(msg1),
The corresponding histories at each point for ap are histap
2
1
8
7
histap
(C) = histap
(C).no − op(),..., histap
(C) = histap
(C).receive(msg4).

Similarly, the client’s histories can be given as histcl1 (C) = histcl0 (C).no − op(),
histcl2 (C) = histcl1 (C).receive(msg1),..., histcl7 (C) = histcl6 (C).send(msg4),
histcl8 (C) = histcl7 (C).no − op().
In a similar fashion, environment’s histories are given as:
1
0
2
1
histen
(C) = histen
(C).receive(msg1), histen
(C) = histen
(C).send(msg1),...,
7
6
8
7
histen
(C) = histen
(C).receive(msg4), histen
(C) = histen
(C).send(msg4).

6.5 Formal Proofs
We make use of the ideal cryptography and algebra freeness assumptions provided in Section 5.3.1.

6.5.1 Penetrator
In our model, the penetrator (or intruder or adversary or saboteur) is a user of the system that tries
to impersonate himself as some other honest agent of the system. The penetrator is assumed to
have the ability to eavesdrop on every communication and generate fake messages. Intuitively,
every sent message is intercepted by the penetrator and all messages received by honest agents
were actually sent by the penetrator. We also allow the penetrator to create and destroy messages.
However, we make use of the general set of assumptions set forth by the researchers in our area and
put a bound on the capability of every participant involved in a protocol. This set of assumption is
described in Section 5.3.1.
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6.5.2 Authentication of the Client and the Access Point
If a message was received by the client at some point in its history, then that message should be
present in the access point’s history at an earlier point.
Theorem 5: If a message “m” is received in the run rcln by the client “cl”, then that message “m”
must have been sent by the access point “ap” at some earlier point than “n”.
Proof 5: Proof of theorem 1 will imply that the client and the access point have completed their
protocol run with matching variables in the same session with each other. The rcln is basically the
history histcl8 (C) and is described in detail in Section 6.4. We need to prove that the message 2
(from Figure 5.3) originates in the history of the client.
Theorem 5.1: {A, Na , M, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA originates in the access point’s history.
Proof 5.1: We assumed that the penetrator does not possess the secret keys of any other participant. We need to prove that any term encrypted with the shared PMK (i.e, KCA ) must originate
only in the histories of the legitimate users of that shared PMK. In other words, we need to show
that any regular (non-penetrator) node does not generate the PMK as an open message. We discuss
the possible set of actions that a penetrator can take in the following lines.
Generate − Message: The penetrator can create a message of the type, h+termi. This means
that the penetrator emits a term without previously obtaining it from anywhere. In our case, the
term is equal to {A, Na , M, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA . Since any penetrator can not originate a
term encrypted with the key KPMK , this implies that {A, Na , M, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA was
not originated in the penetrator’s history.
Flushing: The implies flushing of a message and can be represented as h−termi. Intuitively,
this indicates that the penetrator received a term from somewhere and then flushed it. We claim that
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{A, Na , M, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA is not originated by the penetrator because an originating
node is always a node where a message was sent. We do not need to worry about any history
indicating the reception of a message as it does nt imply origination.
T ee: It can be represented as h−term, +term, +termi. The tee shows that the penetrator received
a term and then forwarded that term twice. As the penetrator received a term in the first node, the
term could not have originated by the penetrator. So {A, Na , M, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA can
not be originated by an action similar to Tee.
Concatenation: Concatenation is of the form h−term1, −term2, +term1term2i. The penetrator
received two terms, concatenated them to form a new term and then forwarded the concatenated
term. Considering our algebra to be free, no new term can be obtained by simply concatenating
other terms. Hence, no new term is generated at the positive node of the concatenation strand.
Instead, the penetrator is sending a concatenated term. So {A, Na , M, s+1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA
can not be formed by concatenation.
S eparation: The trace of separation is h−term1term2, +term1, +term2i. Since penetrator is
getting both the terms, term1 and term2, from the previous node, the separation ability of the
penetrator lacks any positive originating node.
Key: Key emits the key h+Ki. The algebra freeness assumption guarantees that a key cannot be
equal to any encrypted message. So {A, Na , M, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA cannot be generated
by the penetrator.
Encryption: It can be written as h−K, −term, +{term}K i. The trace of encryption states that
the {term}K is equal to {A, Na , M, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA . Using algebra freeness, if two
encrypted terms are equivalent, the only possibility is that the term is equal to {A, Na , M, s +
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1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K} and K is equal to KCA . It means that the penetrator receives the key KPMK .
We assume that any legitimate participant never sends any secret without encryption. Therefore,
the penetrator does not produce the {A, Na , M, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA .
Decryption: The decryption can be represented as h−K −1 , −{term}K , +termi. As the positive
term is obtained by decrypting the previous node, no positive node serves as an originator.
After ruling out all the possible penetrator possibilities, it is safe to conclude that the term
{A, Na , M, s + 1, MIC, RS NIEa , GT K}KCA originates on a regular node. Since all the messages are
encrypted with symmetric keys and we assume that KCA does not belong to the set of keys held by
the penetrator, we say that no penetrator can sit in the middle and behave as a regular participant
by simply forwarding the messages to the legitimate parties. Hence, the authentication messages
arriving at any regular node must be originated on some non-penetrator nodes.
Similar to the client’s authentication, the authentication of access point can be stated as:
n
Theorem 6: If a message “m” is received in the run rap
by the access point “ap”, then that message

“m” must have been sent by the client “cl” at some earlier point than “n”.

Proof 6: We start with proving a statement similar to the one we proved earlier.
Theorem 6.1: {C, Nc , M, s + 1, MIC}KCA originates in the client’s history.

Proof6.1: We assumed that KCA < K pen , meaning that the penetrator does not has the possession
of the secret key shared between two non-penetrator participants. By using a proof similar to proof
5.1, we can infer that {C, Nc , M, s + 1, MIC}KCA originates on a regular node in the bundle and can
say that the term {C, Nc , M, s + 1, MIC}KCA originates in the access point’s history. The basic notion
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is the guarantee that if a message encrypted with a secret key is received by a participant, then that
message must have originated on a regular node. However, we can not guarantee that a message
sent by a legitimate party will always be received.

6.6 Summary
For the formal verification of distributed security protocols, it is important to capture the formal
model of knowledge. We present a multi-agent architecture to model the knowledge and behavior
of agents involved in a distributed system. In particular, our focus is to verify the authentication
property of distributed security protocols. The presented architecture contains an explicit notion of
multi-agents, which is lacking in some existing verification frameworks. We extend our contributions to present a verification technique. The presented verification technique is simple and defines
an explicit involvement of every agent in the multi-agent environment. The proposed architecture
and verification strategy are generic in nature. We also apply the proposed technique to analyze
the 4-way handshake of the 802.11i protocol.
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CHAPTER 7
FUTURE WORK

Our future work is divided into two main steps as explained in the following sections.

7.1 Additional Security Properties
We will attempt to include security properties such as secrecy, in future. Secrecy is the practice of
hiding information from others. Modern cryptosystems have this property as a main design goal.
In our future network, the system will provide proofs of verification for strong data confidentiality,
integrity, and replay protection for every transmitted message. Data confidentiality and integrity
help build a secure channel for the user to communicate in an insecure environment. They aim to
provide an environment where only the communicating users are able to understand the received
messages, and generate or modify valid messages. We aim to construct a trusted environment
where replayed messages should be recognized and discarded even though they may pass the integrity check. These requirements could be satisfied by well-designed cryptographic functions and
appropriate replay protection techniques.

7.1.1 A Formal Threat model
We plan to extend the formal threat model to security protocols other than 802.11i. Our threat
model will be based on the properties described in Chapter 3. The threat model will include:
1. Eavesdropping: Eavesdropping occurs when an adversary can easily sniff and store all the
traffic in a WLAN due to the characteristics of the wireless communication. An adversary
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may learn partial or complete information from certain messages even when messages are
encrypted. It is important to consider that this possibility exists if common message fields
are predictable or redundant.
2. Message Insertion: This is possible because an adversary is capable of inserting a message
into the wireless network with some moderate equipment. In our analysis, we have assumed
that an adversary can generate any chosen packet, modify contents of a packet, and completely control the transmission of the packet.
3. Message Deletion and Interception: Similar to message insertion, we have assumed message
deletion and message interception. In message deletion, an adversary is capable of removing
a packet from the network before the packet reaches its destination. Message interception
means that an adversary is able to control a connection completely.
4. Masquerading: An adversary can masquerade and use the malicious access point. An adversary is also able to install his own AP.
5. Session Hijacking: An adversary might hijack a session.
6. Man-in-the-Middle: An adversary can launch a man-in-the middle attack as discussed in
5.3.3.4. A more rigorous analysis is planned for future where these attacks will be evaluated
on the final system.
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7.2

Verification of a Wireless Mesh Network

A mesh network is a communications network in which there are at least two pathways to each
node. If every node has a direct connection to every other node then the mesh network becomes a
fully meshed network. Most mesh networks are partially meshed because a fully meshed network
is very costly. In mesh networks, component parts can all connect to each other via multiple hops.
Each node needs only to transmit as far as the next node and thus act as repeaters to transmit data
from nearby nodes to peers that are too far away to reach, resulting in a network that can span large
distances. The resulting infrastructure is reliable, decentralized, and fault tolerant.
Future work will deal with the application of our strategy to other distributed protocols and
environments such as a Wireless Mesh Network (WMN). It is important to guarantee the security
properties of the WMN to ensure a desired secure system. We state that a WMN can be understood
as a Multi-Agent System (MAS) where each node represents an agent of the MAS. The purpose
is to benefit from the existing state-of-the-art verification techniques applicable in the multi-agent
domain. Our contributions will include:
1. translating the mesh network in a multi-agent framework,
2. representing the security properties as the MAS’s formal specifications,
3. applying the Strand System verification strategy to prove the correctness of the MAS’s security properties.
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7.2.1

Virtual Private Network

We have restricted ourselves to the link layer level authentication. However, it is valuable to note
that there are many other security mechanisms in industry, which extend their corporate Virtual Private Network (VPN) based on IPsec, SSL, or SSH to protect the wireless link. These solutions are
also successful. They provide the end-to- end security in different layers, and can be implemented
with link layer authentication together for better security. We plan to incorporate the verification
of these systems in future as well.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

Used with a communication protocol, a security protocol provides secure delivery of data between
two or more parties using cryptographic operations such as encrypt, decrypt, and so forth. Employing informal methods for the verification of security protocols has yielded poor results. In order to
foil the vulnerabilities of a security protocol, one would need to employ more sophisticated modes
of analyses. Formal methods are useful for the analysis of security protocols because they allow
one to do both a thorough analysis of the different paths which an intruder can take, and to specify
precisely the environmental assumptions that have been made. The application of formal methods
to cryptographic protocols refers to mathematics or logic based techniques for the specification,
development, and verification of these protocols.
We introduce an explicit notion of security objectives that needs to be defined before starting
the formal verification process. The definition of these objectives is important because these are
the methods that enforce security policies and mitigate security risks. We address the security of
WLANs in terms of its security objectives. We present a formal model that provides basis for the
formal verification of security protocols. The presented mathematical model is then used for the
correctness proofs of a WLAN using the 802.11i protocol.
We also develop a modal logic and a proof based approach for the security protocol verification
using the Strand Space framework. Our presented models use simple logical formulas to represent
the security primitives. The presented approaches allow us to establish the formal proofs about
a participant by looking at its own run of the protocol. In our proof based model, we present a
generic set of proofs to establish the correctness of a security protocol. In this work, we restrict
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ourselves to the verification of the authentication property of the security protocols.
After defining our formal models, we use our proof based system to perform the formal verification of the 802.11i protocol. We start by modeling the 802.11i protocol into our proof based
system and then perform the formal verification of the authentication property. We then present the
high level abstraction of a protocol run. We consider a penetrator, empower its capabilities, and
evaluate the authentication of the proposed protocol. Given the constraints and suggestions of the
proposed architecture, we state convincingly that any attempt to defy the authentication mechanism
of the 802.11i protocol will not be successful. We further describe a situation where modifications
to our model will lead to a successful man-in-the-middle attack.
We also present a multi-agent approach that includes an explicit notion of multi-agent. The
Strand Space framework does not contain an explicit notion of multi-agents and assumes that all the
information available to a principal is either supplied initially or is contained in messages received
by that principal. However, an agent may combine information from different roles played by him
in a protocol to launch a powerful attack. The presented approach addresses this issue by modeling
the behavior of a distributed system as a multi-agent system. Our multi-agent model captures the
combined information, the formal model of knowledge, and the belief of agents over time. We also
apply the proposed technique to analyze the 4-way handshake of the 802.11i protocol.
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